Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace by Martin, Natasha
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2008 
Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains 
Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace 
Natasha Martin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Natasha Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the 
Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117 (2008). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/520 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
CONNECTICUT
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 40 MAY 2008 NUMBER 4
Article
Immunity for Hire:
How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains
Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace
NATASHA T. MARTIN
This Article provides a doctrinal critique of an employment discrimination principle recognized
by the courts-the same-actor inference-based on its incongruence with both cognitive psychological
research and the social dynamics of the workplace. The same-actor principle, in its most potent form,
provides that where the same decision-maker engages in an alleged adverse employment action within
a short period of time of making a positive employment decision, such evidence creates a strong
presumption that the decision-maker harbored no unlawful discriminatory animus. The same-actor
doctrine was first recognized by the Fourth Circuit in Proud v. Stone, in which the court deemed the
nature of the hirer-firer relationship significant on the ultimate question of discrimination. The
rationale of the Proud court is based on the assumed irrationality of the 'psychological costs"
incurred by a decision-maker in hiring and thus associating with workers from a group one dislikes
only to take some adverse action against them thereafter. The majority of the federal circuits
addressing the issue have adopted the same-actor principle, many endorsing the rationale of Proud
with, if not resounding approval, at least passive acceptance. The circuits are split on the weight that
should be afforded same-actor evidence, and the Supreme Court has yet to enter the dialogue. Due to
the entrenchment of the doctrine within workplace jurisprudence and its debilitating effects on
plaintiffs, it bears assessing its effectiveness as a shorthand reference for identifying discriminatory
animus and evaluating the ultimate question of discrimination.
This Article makes the case that the same-actor principle fails to comport with the realities of the
contemporary workplace, specifically, its complexities in structural, cultural, and managerial terms.
Expanding on the observations of a small number of scholars, this Article enhances the inquiry by
engaging social science (including cognitive psychological research), organizational behavior, and
management theory literature relating to organizational design and the workplace decision making
process. By informing examination of the doctrine with these interdisciplinary sources, the Article
interrogates the underlying psychological assumption of the same-actor principle, demonstrating its
incompatibility with contemporary work life and notions of equality under employment discrimination
jurisprudence. Due to the historical, social and cultural contingency of law in society, the problematic
nature of the same-actor principle is best revealed by drawing on insights from disciplines devoted to
the study of corporate culture, human behavior, and power dynamics within organizations. The Article
posits that the same-actor inference is anchored in an outdated narrative of the American workplace
and an inaccurate view of human motivation.
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Immunity for Hire:
How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains
Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace
NATASHA T. MARTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is further complicated by the fact that the habit of ignoring
[difference] is understood to be a graceful, even generous, liberal gesture.
To notice is to recognize an already discredited difference. To enforce its
invisibility through silence is to allow the [outsider] a shadowless
participation in the dominant cultural body.
- Toni Morrison, Nobel Laureate'
Employment organizations have become increasingly complex
microcosms in relational, cultural, and operational terms. An employee in
today's workplace is likely subject to a flattened organizational chart,
without a single supervisor, and beholden to a group of peers operating in a
palpable institutional culture that emphasizes particular values and norms.
As organizations phase out direct reporting lines, the use of work teams,
collaborative problem solving, and collective decision-making processes
have become mainstream in the contemporary American workplace.2
Businesses employ various self-management tools and techniques that
have transformed the orchestration of work and the utilization of workers.
Consequently, these systems of organizational design produce shifting
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, nmartin@seattleu.edu. B.S.
Xavier University of Louisiana; J.D., University of Notre Dame. I am indebted to those who gave
emotional support, editorial advice and other invaluable guidance as this project evolved including Jan
Ainsworth, Mario Barnes, Jacqueline Bridgeman, Devon Carbado, Maggie Chon, Tristen Green, Lily
Kahng, Emily Houh, Ann McGinley, John Mitchell, Camille Nelson, Catherine Smith and Angela
Onwuachi-Willig. I thank my dean, Kellye Testy, for her generous research and travel support. I am
indebted to my research team including former research assistants Ciarelle Jimenez-Valdez, Lori
Gonzalez, Gena Bomotti and Christine Slattery, and more recently, assistants Holly Michel, Carol
Koppelman, Lydia Koroma, and Kerry Fitz-Gerald of the Seattle University Law Library. This project
benefited greatly from presentations at the Annual Labor and Employment Law Colloquia at Marquette
University and the Colorado/University of Denver, the 2007 Iowa Writer's Conference, and faculty
workshops at University of Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law and the University of
Cincinnati College of Law. Last but not least, I thank my husband, Todd, for his love and support, and
our daughter, Jewel, for her constant inspiration.
1 TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 9-10
(1992).
2 See HENRY P. SIMS, JR. & PETER LORENZ, THE NEW LEADERSHIP PARADIGM: SOCIAL
LEARNING AND COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS 199-216 (1992) (discussing self-managing teams and
collaboration).
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dynamics that affect interpersonal relations, behavior, and decision-
making. Largely, these intricacies are lost on the American judiciary,
however, as it attempts to decipher unlawful discriminatory conduct and
uphold the anti-discrimination principles of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.3
Congress established Title VII to promote fair employment practices
within the workplace. Intended to serve a curative role and to facilitate
equal opportunity, the statute prohibits disparate treatment based on race,
color, sex, religion, and national origin.4 Title VII protects certain classes
of workers from discrimination to ensure that an individual's identity does
not pose a liability to access, engagement, and advancement in work life.
While Title VII expressly prohibits discrimination, it remains within the
purview of the courts' authority to filter complex fact-specific
controversies and decipher unlawful discriminatory conduct. In engaging
Title VII, courts attempt to balance the competing interests of those in the
labor force and the organizations that employ them.
Efforts to explore the circumstantial terrain for meaningful markers of
discriminatory conduct have produced various interpretational sideshows;
formulations that often bear no connection to modem workplace realities.
These judicial maneuvers have diminished the statute's effectiveness as a
shield for workers from the venom of discrimination. Hence, the courts
have created various loopholes that allow organizations to remain
relatively autonomous, freely adhere to their particular business goals, and,
far too often, escape liability for workplace discrimination.5
In 1991, the tension between employment discrimination law and
organizational life produced another such protective device-the same-
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
4 Id § 2000e-2. Other federal antidiscrimination statutes modeled on Title VII prohibit disparate
treatment based on age and disability. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000), prohibits discrimination on the basis of age against applicants
and employees who are forty years of age and older. Id. § 631(a). Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000), prohibits discrimination in
employment against qualified individuals with disabilities, who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job. Id. § 12112.
5 See generally Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 49 (2006) (concluding that plaintiffs in racial harassment litigation are
more likely to lose their case than defendants either in summary judgment proceedings or at trial
primarily because of conscious or unconscious judge or juror bias); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA
Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203 (1993) (criticizing the rampant use of summary judgment and suggesting
its inappropriateness and incompatibility with Title VII law); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts
Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury
Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 511 (2003)
(concluding that women and minorities have a lower success rate at bringing employment
discrimination claims because of juror bias); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary
Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Papers,
Working Paper No. 71, 2007), available at http//papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=968834
(arguing that the current summary judgment procedures facilitate gender discrimination and gender-
bias in federal courts).
[Vol. 40:1117
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actor principle. In its most potent form, the same-actor principle provides
that where the same decision-maker engages in an alleged adverse
employment action within a short period of time of making a positive
employment decision, such evidence creates a strong presumption that the
decision-maker harbored no unlawful discriminatory animus.
More than fifteen years after its formulation, the doctrine is fully
entrenched in workplace law. The same-actor principle has received
affirmation from most of the courts addressing the issue, with most
endorsing the Proud court's rationale with, if not resounding approval, at
least passive acceptance. The circuits are split on the weight that should be
afforded same-actor evidence, and the Supreme Court has yet to enter the
dialogue. Most often the courts, however, deem same-actor evidence
relevant and significant if the plaintiff fails to rebut it. In fact, in the
parlance of workplace discrimination law, the same-actor inference is
widely deemed to be common sense. All too often, courts adopting some
variation of this principle assert how nonsensical it is that a decision-maker
who hired an individual would engage in discriminatory action in
subsequent decisions relating to that same person's terms and conditions of
employment.6 The doctrine is formidable in Title VII law, and often
presents an insurmountable challenge for plaintiffs, debilitating their
attempts to prove unlawful discrimination.
The premise of this Article is that the same-actor principle constitutes
an untenable analytical paradigm that fails to comport with the realities of
the contemporary American workplace, specifically, its complexities in
structural, cultural and managerial terms. Courts take a snapshot of the
plaintiffs work life before and after the alleged adverse employment
action, search for a common thread, and assign meaning without any
regard for the powerful human and institutional forces at work.
Overwhelmingly, the courts' analysis ignores aspects of modem
employment settings such as workplace configurations, evaluative models,
and corporate culture, all of which influence decision-making in
organizations and bear on the underlying motivation for those decisions.
To reduce an inquiry that is so embedded with complexity to a shorthand
reference based on what may be nothing more than happenstance, that the
same decision-maker remains involved, appears nonsensical or at a
6 For more recent examples, see Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir.
2006) (it makes "little sense" to deduce discriminatory motive by most of the same individuals who
hired plaintiff ten months earlier) (emphasis added); Nwanna v. Ashcroft, 66 Fed. Appx. 9, 15 (7th Cir.
2002) (deeming same-actor inference based on "common-sense notion that someone who disliked or
intended to discriminate against a person would never initially hire that person"); Kassa v. Selland
Auto Transport, Inc., No. C05-1304P, 2006 WL 2559865, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2006)
("Plaintiff's evidence must be persuasive enough to answer the obvious question of how the court is
find a racial bias when the person (or persons) who decided to terminate the plaintiff are the same
persons who approved the decision to hire him .... ) (emphasis added); Holmes v. Marriot Corp., 831
F. Supp. 691, 701-02 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (referring to same-actor inference as the "common sense"
inference) (emphasis added).
20081 IMMUNITY FOR HIRE
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minimum, nafve.7
The same-actor doctrine is based on several faulty assumptions. First,
it presumes that discrimination emanates only from a single bad actor, a
biased individual who harbors negative feelings about another. Second, it
assumes that voluntary association with one who is different in the context
of work means the decision-maker harbors no such negative feelings, or if
he did, he has now resolved them and they are incapable of resurrection.
This greatly oversimplifies how bias operates and ignores the prevalence of
grouping and collective processing in organizations, vectors that create the
conditions for bias to flourish. Moreover, it is precisely due to the
stratification and collective nature of the decision-making process that the
same-actor principle constitutes an unreliable marker for discriminatory
motive. Despite the superficial plausibility that one who hires or promotes
an employee would not thereafter harbor discriminatory bias towards that
same person, literature on organizational behavior, group dynamics, and
social psychological forces reveals that bias may not rear its ugly head
until after an employee is immersed in a work setting or work group.
Significantly, the same-actor principle exonerates employers from their
responsibility to address structural and cultural barriers to workplace
equality, forces within the employers' control and which often they employ
strategically for business reasons. The same-actor doctrine credits
employers for hiring minorities by affording them protection in the event
they decide to rid the workplace of individuals in protected categories
under Title VII. By "hiring brown" in the first instance, for example, a
racist employer is shielded against allegations of racism or somehow
incapable of racist tendencies altogether in the eyes of the courts. In this
way, the same-actor doctrine operates as a subsidy for those employers that
make the effort to diversify their workforces, cheapening notions of
acceptability and workplace inclusiveness. This "free pass" represents
another misstep by the judiciary based on a fanciful narrative about social
and structural dynamics within the contemporary workplace and human
motivation more generally.
Overall, the Article seeks to challenge the underlying psychological
assumption of the same-actor doctrine and demonstrates its incompatibility
7 Prolific legal scholar Richard Delgado has observed that "racism is normal, not aberrant, in
American society. Because racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape, it looks ordinary and
natural to persons in the culture." RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE xvi (2d ed. 2000). Perhaps, it is precisely this norm highlighted by Delgado that
may offer some insight into why the courts so readily subscribe good meaning to acts by the same
decision-maker. Similarly, another scholar has argued that the current anti-discrimination regime
(including in the employment arena), is based on the view that "discrimination and subordination are
anomalies perpetrated by a few bad actors in isolated pockets of society." Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman,
Seeing the Old Lady: A New Perspective on the Age Old Problems of Discrimination, Inequality, and
Subordination, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 263, 267 (2007); see also Lu-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION
BY DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE (2006) (explaining that in modem-day society
discrimination is becoming the default: an accepted but unintentional standard).
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 40:1117
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with contemporary work life. By expanding on the surprisingly limited
legal literature addressing this issue, the Article enhances the inquiry by
engaging interdisciplinary sources including cognitive psychological,
organizational behavior, and management theory literature relating to
organizational design, decision-making processes, and the socio-cultural
forces inherent in workplace dynamics.8  Twenty years ago, Charles
Lawrence pioneered the use of this interdisciplinary lens with respect to
racial bias in society.9 More legal scholars are awakening to the promise
that such sociological literature holds for a deeper understanding of the
operation of workplace bias.'0 Accordingly, the Article can be seen as
8 The writings devoted to exploration of the same-actor doctrine consist primarily of student
comments and notes. See Anna Laurie Bryant & Richard A. Bales, Using the Same Actor "Inference "
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 255 (providing a thorough analysis of the
case law and policies regarding the same-actor inference); Marlinee C. Clark, Note, Discrimination
Claims and "Same-Actor" Facts: Inference or Evidence?, 28 U. MEM, L. REV. 183 (1997) (analyzing
recent employment discrimination cases in each circuit utilizing the same-actor inference); Bethany M.
Gilliland, Comment, Employment Law-Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture: The Sixth Circuit Clarifies
and Qualifies the Proper Analysis of ADEA Cases, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 975 (2004) (reviewing one of
the most recent circuit decisions addressing the same-actor inference in the context of age
discrimination); Ross B. Goldman, Note, Putting Pretext in Context: Employment Discrimination, the
Same-Actor Inference, and the Proper Roles of Judges and Juries, 93 VA. L. REv. 1533 (2007)
(criticizing the same-actor inference as applied to summary judgment or directed verdicts for employers
in employment discrimination cases); Julie S. Northrup, Note, The "Same Actor Inference" in
Employment Discrimination: Cheap Justice?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 193 (1998) (discussing the expansion
of the same-actor inference and urging for restraining in its application); Jennifer R. Taylor, Student
Work, The "Same Actor Inference ": A Mechanism for Employment Discrimination?, 101 W. VA. L.
REV. 565 (1999) (detailing the same-actor inference in Title VII discrimination lawsuits and criticizing
its application to summary judgment decisions).
9 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Several legal scholars have recognized the benefit
of social cognition and behavioral literature to workplace law. For other important contributions by
legal scholars, see generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005);
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000);
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).
Additionally, social science scholars have offered critical insights from the organizational behavior
realm as well. See generally JOHN F. DOVIDIO & SAMUEL L. GAERTNER, PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM (1986); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY VOLUME 11 357-92 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998).
'0 See, e.g., Jacquelyn Bridgeman, The Thrill of Victory and the Agony of Defeat: What Sports
Tells Us about Achieving Equality in America, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2008); Devon
W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283 (2002) (exploring the difficulties of
identifying and managing racial groups at the bottom); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
91, 92 (2003) (arguing that workplace discrimination must be conceptualized in terms of workplace
dynamics as opposed to existing solely in an actor's state of mind); Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and
the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 639, 645 (1998) (rethinking approaches to regulation of discrimination in the workplace in
response to changes in organizational structure and demographics); Michelle Adams, Intergroup
Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089 (2002) (offering a
group-based approach to equal protection law that accounts for intergroup rivalry, social identity and
competitive action); see also Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006)
(compilation of articles discussing behavioral realism and implicit bias). Corporate law scholars have
2008] IMMUNITY FOR HIRE
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contributing to a larger interdisciplinary movement to conceptualize
workplace discrimination as an amalgamation of complex human and
organizational dimensions.
This Article proceeds in three parts. To begin, Part II describes the
historical basis of the same-actor doctrine, and then reviews its evolution
and expansion, highlighting trends critical to its development. This Part
begins to set forth the competing narratives of the doctrine, examining it in
relation to the prevailing analytical framework for circumstantial evidence
cases of discrimination under Title VII.
Part III challenges the legitimacy of the same-actor principle by
mapping the doctrine to the complex realities of the modem workplace,
building on advances in organizational behavior, management theory, and
cognitive psychological research. Canvassing these interdisciplinary
sources reveals the shortcomings of courts' current approach.
Part IV evaluates the same-actor doctrine in the context established in
Part III and exposes the courts' oversimplification of discriminatory
animus. Also, Part IV observes that recent cases exemplify the value of a
more nuanced inquiry, one that accounts for the complex human,
institutional, structural, and cultural dimensions of the workplace and
broadens our understanding of workplace bias. Finally, Part IV calls for
the discontinuance of the doctrine, asserting that whatever slight relevance
same-actor evidence may have is outweighed significantly by the costs of
discrimination in the American workplace.
II. PROUD BEGINNINGS AND BEYOND
A. The Proud Beginning: The Origin of the Same-Actor Principle
The same-actor principle entered the workplace jurisprudential
landscape in 1991 with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Proud v. Stone.II
In that decision, the court held that where the same person both hires and
fires an employee within a relatively short period of time, the employer is
entitled to a strong inference that the alleged adverse employment action
was not motivated by discriminatory animus. 2 In this court's view, the
fact that the same decision-maker engaged in a positive employment
action, shortly before allegedly taking an adverse action, creates a strong
presumption that the decision-maker harbored no discriminatory animus.
The rationale of the Proud court is based on the assumed irrationality of
the "psychological costs" incurred by a decision-maker in associating with
workers from a group one dislikes, only to take some adverse action
also applied behavioral theories to understanding legal and organizational dynamics. See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002).
1 Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).
12 Id. at 798.
[Vol. 40:1117
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against them thereafter.13 That is, one who is predisposed against a
particular category would not have hired one who belongs to that group
from the outset.
In this case, Warren Proud submitted an application for employment
with the Department of Army's Central Accounting Division which
indicated his date of birth. The decision-maker, Robert Klauss, selected
Proud from a pool of seven candidates, of which Proud was the oldest.'
4
Based on several variables, including education, background, and
experience, Klauss considered Proud the most qualified.
Proud began working as a Chief Accountant for the division in June
1985. Just about two and a half months later, Klauss's opinion of Proud's
capabilities changed. Dissatisfied with Proud's handling of five funds for
which the division provided accounting services, Klauss counseled Proud
on two occasions. During the second counseling session, Proud received a
thirty day warning that he would be terminated if his job performance did
not improve. Continued dissatisfaction with Proud's performance
prompted Klauss to fire him in October 1985, approximately four and a
half months after he hired him.'5
Almost eighteen months later, the Department filled Proud's former
position by promoting a thirty-two year old female from within the
organization. Proud filed suit two months later alleging his dismissal was
the product of age discrimination. In Proud's view, his alleged
performance deficiencies emanated from the Department's failure to
provide him adequate training, difficulty in obtaining needed data or the
receipt of erroneous data, and ineffective management, including lack of
written procedures. Additionally, he claimed that the department did not
discharge similarly situated younger employees with comparable
performance records.'
6
The district court granted the Army's motion for a directed verdict at
the close of plaintiffs evidence at trial. The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
focusing its assessment of the ultimate question of discrimination on same-
actor evidence-the undisputed fact that the same decision-maker both
hired and fired the plaintiff with knowledge of his age. The court deemed
this same-actor evidence as creating a strong inference that discriminatory
animus did not motivate the decision-maker. 7 In espousing this principle,
the court stated that "[o]ne is quickly drawn to the realization that '[c]laims
that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem
13Id. at 797.
14 See id. at 796 (noting that the other candidates were 63, 62, 56, 37 and 28 years of age while
Proud was 68 years old).
" Id. at 796-97.
16 ld. at 797.
"7 Id. at 798.
2008] IMMUNITY FOR HIRE
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irrational.""' 18  From the perspective of the putative discriminator, "[i]t
hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby
incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire
them once they are on the job."'9 Relying on no data points or other
guideposts in pronouncing this rule, the Proud court made an incredible
leap, one that has spawned a virtual cottage industry for employer
successes, including summary dismissals 20 and directed verdicts.2' As one
scholar has noted, the judiciary formulated this concept without
consideration of the social psychological implications of discrimination.
22
This move is ironic given the court's presumptuous statement in Proud
regarding the "psychological costs" of one's association with differences in
the workplace.
In making its pronouncement, the Fourth Circuit relied on a sentence
from an article wherein Professors John J. Donohue III and Peter
Siegelman attempted to explain the rise in employment discrimination
litigation, in particular, allegations of discriminatory discharge, despite the
23purported increase in access to employment for women and minorities.
In an effort to dispel a myth about workplace management and motive,
Donohue and Siegelman made the statement, seemingly in passing, that the
Proud court relied upon when placing so much value on same-actor
evidence.24 Interestingly, since Proud's beginnings, courts have relied on
this statement and the court's rationale.
The Fourth Circuit articulated the same-actor principle in a brief
's Id. at 797 (quoting John J. Donohue III & Peter Seigelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1017 (1991)) (emphasis added).
'9 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., Morrison v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 581, 586 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of employer deeming plaintiff's evidence insufficient, particularly where
the same-actor inference comes into play).
21 See, e.g., Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 231 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming
judgment as a matter of law in favor of employer in light of same-actor inference and employee's
failure to establish all elements of a prima facie case). The same-actor doctrine even has potential
implications for jury deliberations as well. For example, in an effort to frame the inquiry for jurors,
employers seek jury instructions regarding same-actor evidence. See, e.g., Banks v. Travelers Cos.,
180 F.3d 358, 366-67 (2nd Cir. 1999) (holding that the "district court properly permitted Travelers to
urge the jurors to draw this commonsensical inference from the facts," and therefore deeming it
unnecessary for "jurors to receive an instruction from the judge in order to consider doing so"); see also
Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 351 (lst Cir. 1998).
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender
Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. Soc. IsSUES 835, 836, 840-41
(2004) (asserting that judges function as "intuitive psychologists," but unlike actual psychologists, use
definitions of discrimination that are in many ways inadequate to address modem bias).
23 Id. (quoting Donohue & Seigelman, supra note 18, at 984-85).
24 Donohue & Seigelman, supra note 18, at 1017. To put the statement in context, the full
passage reads:
Claims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational:
It hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring
the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on
the job. Such behavior seems doubly irrational given that the expected penalties for
terminating a worker are probably much higher than for failing to hire her.
Id. (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 40:1117
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opinion using strong language. For example, the court deems evidence
that the same person hired and fired the employee to raise a "strong
inference" of a "compelling nature," therefore creating a powerful
inference relating to the ultimate question of discrimination. Despite the
fact that the factual record in Proud reflected documented performance
deficiencies on the part of the plaintiff, the court chose to accord particular
significance to the fact that the same individual both hired and fired the
plaintiff within a short period of time and with knowledge of his age.
Though the record also reflected a myriad of contentions from the
plaintiff's perspective as to why his discharge constituted age
discrimination, the court centered its assessment of plaintiffs claim on the
same-hirer-same-firer evidence.26  Because this competing evidence
seemed ripe for jury resolution, the court asserted itself in a manner that
broke the tie.
The Fourth Circuit's formulation in Proud reinforces the notion that
courts refuse to sit as "super personnel review boards" monitoring or
dictating the way in which employers engage in workplace management. 7
What emerges from Proud is a story about an omniscient and benevolent
employer, one who deserves the court's deference because it hired the
individual in the first instance. Notwithstanding the court's rationale, a
survey of post-Proud decisions shows how the judiciary has responded to
Proud's call for circumspect evaluation of allegations of workplace
discrimination. As explored below in Part B, the Fourth Circuit's decision
has manifested a cult-like following by other circuits and their lower
courts. This expansion reflects both an unexamined acceptance of the
principle, unmoored from workplace realities, and a distortion of the
primary question in intentional discrimination cases-the motive of the
actor.28
"' Proud, 945 F.2d at 797-98 (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 797. The consistency of the decision-maker holds no more probative value than any other
aspect of circumstantial evidence present in the case.
27 In the employment discrimination context, deference to employers' business judgment is
salient. See, e.g., Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (1 1th Cir. 1984) ("[An]
employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or
for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason."); Hutson v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995) (opining that courts do not "sit as super-personnel
departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgment made by employers, except to
the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination"); see also Millbrook v. IBP, Inc.,
280 F.3d 1169, 1181 (7th Cir. 2002); Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 487
(7th Cir. 1996).
28 State of mind of the actor became center stage in workplace law when the Supreme Court
devised a framework for analyzing individual claims of discrimination under Title VII in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). Certainly, much has been made about whether a
search for intent is the appropriate inquiry. See, e.g., Krieger, supra notes 9, 22. However, this
remains the predominant analytical framework under Title VII for disparate treatment cases, and the
one in which the same-actor doctrine remains prominent. However, I acknowledge that discovering the
mindset of the actor-the unspeakable opinions of decision makers in the workplace-is a difficult
task. See, e.g., Green, supra note 10, at 112 (observing that the difficulty of the courts to ferret out
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B. The Presumption Superhighway-Same Actor Doctrine's Formidable
Presence
Every federal circuit has adopted some variation of the same-actor
principle. To summarize the continuum, there are largely two
camps-those that buy, wholesale, the Proud principle and rationale, and
those that apply some discount to its value. A slight majority of the
circuits consider same-actor evidence almost irrebuttable in negating the
employer's discriminatory motive. Specifically, the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have applied the doctrine in its
most potent forms.29  The formulation of the principle in these circuits
amounts to a strong inference against discrimination, often warranting
summary dismissal of plaintiffs' lawsuits. In this regard, the same-actor
evidence in these circuits creates an ostensibly mandatory inference,
serving as a dead-end to plaintiffs' hopes of redress for alleged workplace
discrimination.
After its initial silence, the Tenth Circuit recently joined the fray,
holding that same-actor evidence raises a strong inference against
discriminatory intent and affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. 30  Therefore, now, in eight of the eleven circuits, same-actor
evidence often carries nearly irrebuttable presumptive value with respect to
discriminatory motive.31
discrimination is the elusive state of mind, "dissecting the mind of the decisionmaker, searching for
signs that discriminatory animus or conscious bias motivated the decisionmaker to take a particular
action at a precisely defined moment in time"); see also infra note 123.
29 See, e.g., Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1286 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that
plaintiff's case is "weakened" when the same actor is responsible for both hiring and firing that occurs
within a short period of time because a "strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory
motive"); Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 366 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen the person who made
the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to impute to her an
invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire. This is especially so when
the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring."); Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d
219, 231 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that "[i]t strains credibility to believe that Chief Wells would have
falsely rated Taylor as marginal in one category in her performance evaluation only eight months after
he recommended that she be hired, so that he could prevent her from being promoted to the rank of
corporal because she was a woman"); EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145,
152 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The same hirer/firer inference has strong presumptive value."); Brown v. CSC
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting its approval of the same actor inference and
quoting Proud); LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993) (asserting that
there was nothing in the record suggesting why the employer who approved a pay raise for an
employee would develop an aversion to older employees less than two years later); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt
Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 175 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[i]t is simply incredible, in light of the
weakness of plaintiff's evidence otherwise, that the company officials who hired him at age fifty-one
had suddenly developed an aversion to older people less than two years later").
30 The Tenth Circuit in Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., joined its sister circuits that deem this
information significant and persuasive with respect to the ultimate question of discrimination. Antonio
v. Sygma Network Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). While the court declined to
recognize a presumption, it viewed same-actor evidence as raising a "strong inference," affirming
summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. at 1183.
31 For a more detailed description of the continuum, see reference to the author's companion
work-in-progress that more closely tracks the migration across the circuits and analyzes it in relation to
recent developments under Title VII jurisprudence. See supra note 62.
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The remainder of the circuits, the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh, have
shown some restraint in their application of the same-actor principle.
While they accept generally the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine,
they have detoured some from Proud, approaching it with relative caution.
Rather than inferential value, these circuits consider same-actor evidence
relevant information, along with all other evidence, from which a fact
finder can draw an inference of absence of discriminatory animus.32
From "ermissible" to "strong 3 3  inference; "presumptive ' 34  to
"inferential" 5 value, the strength and weight accorded same-actor evidence
has made understanding this doctrine difficult to say the least. Some
courts describe the effect of the doctrine as a "presumption, 36 while others
denote it as an "inference, 37 and there are others that cast it as both in the
same opinion.38  At its inception, the same-actor factor was deemed to
create a "strong inference" against discrimination. In more recent
decisions, the courts have attempted to clarify the difference.39
32 In this band, the Sixth circuit recently retreated from its more restrictive application of same-
actor evidence. In Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, an age discrimination case, the Sixth Circuit
reconsidered and distinguished its position taken in an earlier case in which it recognized the same-
actor inference and underlying premise under Proud. See Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, 317 F.3d
564, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing the relevant circumstances of the court's earlier decision in
Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transportation Co., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1995) in which it adopted the
same-actor inference). The court has now retreated from its stronger position taken in Buhrmaster.
Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, the court clarified that
same-actor evidence amounts to a permissive inference, not a mandatory one. Wexler, 317 F.3d at 573.
Interestingly, Wexler was hailed as setting a new curve, reflecting a soft turn in the use of the inference
in its most potent forms. However, post-Wexler decisions reveal that the inference is still alive and
well, continuing to invoke strong inferences against discrimination and result in summary dismissal
against plaintiffs. See, e.g., Antonio, 458 F.3d at 1177, 1183-84 (affirming summary judgment where
plaintiff was fired shortly after being hired by the same-actor).
33 Compare Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d. 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing the
same actor inference as "neither a mandatory presumption (on the one hand) nor a mere possible
conclusion for the jury to draw (on the other hand). Rather, it is a 'strong inference' that a court must
take into account on a summary judgment motion."), with Wexler, 317 F.3d at 573 (rejecting the idea
that same-actor evidence creates a mandatory inference) and Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d
1438, 1443 (1lth Cir. 1998) (permissible inference that no discriminatory animus motivated the
defendant).
14 See EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir.1996)
(granting same-actor evidence strong presumptive value).
31 See, e.g., Williams, 144 F.3d at 1443 (permissible inference that no discriminatory animus
motivated the defendant); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541,546 (5th Cir. 1996) ("While evidence
of [same actor] circumstances is relevant in determining whether discrimination occurred, we decline to
establish a rule that no inference of discrimination could arise under such circumstances."); Waldron v.
SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the same-actor inference "is simply
evidence like any other and should not be afforded presumptive value").
36 See Brown, 82 F.3d at 658 & n.25 (noting "the existence of the Proud presumption").
37 See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiffs evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the strong same-actor inference).
38 See Our Lady of the Resurrection Med Ctr., 77 F.3d at 152 (stating that the "same hirer/firer
inference has strong presumptive value").
39 See, e.g., Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining
that same-actor evidence creates a strong inference, not a presumption); Coghlan v. American Seafoods
Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing inference and presumption and clarifying that
the same-actor inference is "neither a mandatory presumption ... nor a mere possible conclusion for
the jury to draw").
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Phraseology aside, the effect of the same-actor doctrine on a plaintiffs
case can be damning for sure, depending on the formulation applied by
court.4"
The moral is that the same-actor factor is fully entrenched in the
jurisprudential landscape of the burden-shifting framework of Title VII
circumstantial evidence cases.4' The zealotry of the evolution of the theory
within workplace law emphasizes the enigma of the same-actor doctrine
and its underlying psychological assumption.
C. Same-Actor Inference and the McDonnell Douglas Framework
The analytical framework, commonly known as the McDonnell
Douglas-model, provides a mechanism for evaluating claims of alleged
workplace discrimination in the absence of the smoking gun. State of
mind of the actor became center stage when the Supreme Court devised the
framework for analyzing individual discrimination claims of disparate
treatment under Title VII. The Court declared and refined this framework
in a string of cases beginning with McDonnell Douglas v. Green.42
To prove unlawful disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff
maintains the ultimate burden of proving that the employer engaged in an
unlawful employment practice-an adverse employment-related action
because of a protected characteristic under Title VII. To begin, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. To
succeed in doing so, the plaintiff first must show that she (I) belongs to a
protected class under Title VII, (2) qualifies for the position in question
40 In operational terms, the same-actor inference heightens a plaintiff's burden in a circumstantial
evidence case. The Ninth Circuit recently addressed whether plaintiff's standard for prevailing at the
summary judgment stage is heightened in the presence of same-actor evidence. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d
at 1096 & n. 10 (describing plaintiff's burden as "especially steep" because of the presence of the same-
actor evidence and acknowledging that once confronted with it, plaintiff "must present correspondingly
stronger evidence of bias" to overcome the presumption) (emphases added). Whether the same-actor
doctrine comports with recent Supreme Court Title VII law, particularly at the summary judgment
stage, bears more thorough engagement that is beyond the purview of this Article, hence, my goal with
a current work-in-progress ("work-in-progress"). Suffice it to say that Coghlan represents a trend, one
that arguably results in the judge invading the province of the jury, deferring to business judgment. See
also Goldman, supra note 8, at 1560 (discussing lower federal courts' improper use of the same-actor
inference at the summary judgment stage).
41 Importantly, the full degree to which this doctrine is embedded in the jurisprudence may be
underestimated because so many of the cases are not reported in the Federal Reporter. It appears that
the choice not to publish these cases masks the extent to which the same-actor doctrine pervades the
Title VII disparate treatment law. As part of the work-in-progress referenced infra note 62, the author
plans to include an empirical component that better assesses the impact of the doctrine on plaintiffs. As
Professors Chew and Kelley have commented with respect to racial harassment cases, such
underreporting distorts the credibility of such claims of bias. Chew & Kelley, supra note 5, at 62-63.
Perhaps similarly, without publication, the same actor doctrine's rationale and continued use are
legitimatized in some fashion.
42 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973). See also Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (discussing the McDonnell Douglas
framework); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-77 (1978) (discussing a prima facie
case under the McDonnell Douglas framework).
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and applied for it, (3) was rejected, and (4) the position remained open or
was otherwise filled by another.43 Once the plaintiff meets this burden by
a preponderance of the evidence, a rebuttable presumption arises that the
employer engaged in discrimination." Next, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the alleged adverse employment action, some reasonably specific
factual basis for its decision.45 The respective burdens of the parties at this
stage of the process are not particularly onerous.46 Thus, once the
employer meets its burden of production, the presumption that arose from
the prima facie case disappears. That is, the "legally mandatory inference
of discrimination arising from the plaintiffs initial evidence" no longer
exists.47
Most often, the final stage of the analytical model constitutes the
battleground for the parties. After the employer articulates its justification,
without the benefit of the presumption, the plaintiff has an opportunity to
prove to the finder of fact that the employer's reason is unworthy of
credence, a pretext for unlawful discrimination.48 The plaintiff will present
evidence from which a fact finder can draw an inference of discriminatory
animus.49  Most courts engage in a totality-of-the-evidence assessment to
43 Although McDonnell Douglas involved a failure to hire, the Court made clear that it intended
that the elements of the prima facie case be malleable such that courts adjust the elements to fit the
particular cause of action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 & n. 13 (reminding the lower courts of
the variability of the factual bases for Title VII actions and, thus, "the specification ... of the prima
facie proof [in a hiring case like McDonnell Douglas] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations"). The courts have adapted this proof structure to fit various causes of
action. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281-83 (1976) (disciplinary
discharge context); Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 386 (2d Cir. 2000)
(promotion context); Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1992) (demotion context).
44 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 & n.7.
41 Id. at 254-55.
46 Id. at 253. While the respective burdens are not particularly onerous, it is important to note that
the plaintiff and employer do carry different burdens. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence, whereas the employer has only the burden of production to articulate
some reasonable non-discriminatory basis for its decision. Id. at 253-56. From the employer's
perspective, the Court explained that it "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." The employer's evidence must be legally sufficient to
justify a judgment for the employer, and must set forth the reasons for the employer's action against the
plaintiff. Id. at 254-55.
47 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n.10.
48 As the Supreme Court has expounded, this rubric serves to organize the evidence to facilitate
the court's assessment of the ultimate question of discrimination. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 & n.3 (1983); see also Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (cautioning that the disparate treatment analytical framework was never intended
to be "rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic," but instead provides for orderly evaluation of the evidence).
49 The Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff can prove pretext "either directly . . . or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256. The nature of this evidence varies widely, but the plaintiff may use comparative data
involving similarly situated individuals, offer statistics reflecting the overall make up of the employer's
workforce, or other information surrounding the circumstances of her employment that otherwise raises
an inference of discrimination. Although the presumption of discrimination that attached from
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determine whether more likely than not, the employer engaged in unlawful
discrimination. 50 Despite this seemingly holistic consideration of the
evidence, plaintiffs often fail to prove discriminatory motive, even where
the employer makes a mistake, relies on a false reason, or one that is
pretextual but nonetheless lawful." This phenomenon is explained by the
deference courts accord an employer's business judgment and a hesitation
to second guess its decisions.12 The survival of a plaintiff's claims so often
hinges on her ability to overcome the legitimate non-discriminatory reason
offered by an employer.5 3
It is this third stage of the analysis where same-actor evidence becomes
pertinent to the court's search for discriminatory motive under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The Proud court described the
applicability of same-actor evidence at this stage as creating a "strong
inference that the employer's stated reason for acting against the employee
plaintiff's prima facie case disappears, the evidence from which the presumption arose retains
evidentiary value in the court's analysis of pretext.
'o As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., trial
courts must make a holistic assessment of the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000). The decision also suggests that courts should exercise caution in
granting wholesale motions for summary judgment filed by employers. Id; see also Goldman, supra
note 8, at 1556-57; McGinley, supra note 9, at 459-65 (discussing the implications of Reeves at the
summary judgment stage).
51 See Arnold v. Nursing & Rehab Center at Good Shepherd, LLC, 471 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2006)
(noting that the fact that employer was mistaken that black nurse verbally abused resident does not
matter since employer reasonably believed employee had engaged in the action); Maxfield v. Cintas
Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment where employer's explanation
was false and finding that the plaintiff must show that the reason was false and that discrimination was
the real reason); Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that employer's
decision to give preference to a white employee over a black employee in order to save the white
worker from a layoff did not rise to an inference of discrimination); Zimmerman v. Assocs. First
Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2001) (comparing its interpretation of Reeves with that of
other circuits and opining on plaintiffs' ability to succeed). For an example of an employer's success in
light of evidence reflecting inaccuracy, misrepresentation or other seemingly inappropriate action, see,
for example, Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting employer's proffered reason
that selected candidate was more qualified than plaintiff, but finding that cronyism, while distasteful,
was the real reason for the employer's decision-making, and that cronyism was not influenced by racial
animus).
52 Foster, 71 F.3d at 57; see also supra note 22.
53 The courts' application of the same-actor doctrine seems in direct contravention to the recent
Title VII law. In order to prevail in the face of same-actor evidence, generally, a plaintiff must do more
than cast doubt on the employer's justification; a plaintiff must also present additional evidence that
discrimination was the real reason. See supra note 54. Although Proud predated significant Title VII
law, it implored courts to resist the temptation to become distracted by the nuances of the framework
and forget that the exercise is a search for unlawful discriminatory intent. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d
796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (declining to engage in detailed analysis of plaintiffs contentions). Post-
Reeves decisions reflect that courts continue to struggle in evaluating the essence of a plaintiffs claim
of unlawful discrimination. Compare Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the "Supreme Court in Reeves emphasized the importance of jury fact finding and
reiterated that evidence of the prima facie case plus pretext may, and usually does, establish sufficient
evidence for a jury to find discrimination") (emphasis added), with Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am.
Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "the Supreme Court has indicated that only
occasionally will a prima facie case plus pretext fall short of the burden a plaintiff carries to reach a
jury on the ultimate question of discrimination" but that "such occasions do exist") (citing Reeves, 530
U.S. at 148).
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is not pretextual. 54  Thus, an employer typically argues that because the
same individual involved in the alleged adverse action also hired or
otherwise treated plaintiff favorably, a reasonable fact finder could not
conclude that the basis for the action was discrimination. The plaintiff can
offer evidence to counteract the inference, but as the Proud court surmised,
"in most cases.., such evidence will not be forthcoming." 55 More than
fifteen years later, the court's prediction seems eerily prophetic, as if the
court foretold the story that has emerged regarding plaintiffs' efforts to
overcome the inference and to confront the underlying assumption of the
principle.5 6 Very often plaintiffs' efforts to repudiate same-actor evidence
prove futile, especially in those jurisdictions that draw a strong inference of
non-discrimination, heeding Proud's appeal to "promptly dismiss such
insubstantial claims in order to prevent the statute from becoming a cure
that worsens the malady of... discrimination."57
As discussed below, Proud's faulty rationale and underlying
assumption have provided the gateway for the evolution of this doctrine,
the emergence of another loophole for employers charged with unlawful
workplace acts. For sure, the same-actor principle has confused and
derailed the inquiry for motive in a dangerous fashion, taking us on a route
far from the remedial purposes of Title VII and leading us no closer to
remedying unlawful discrimination under the Act.
D. Wayward Doctrine-The Evolution of the Same-Actor Principle58
Since the formulation of the same-actor principle in 199 1, its evolution
has been steady and expansive. Within five years of the Fourth Circuit's
declaration in Proud, the saliency of its force was undeniable. Nearly
every circuit had recognized and applied some variation of the principle by
then, most with resounding approval of Proud's underlying theme.59 A
minority of these circuits assigned same-actor evidence a supplemental
5 Proud, 945 F.3d at 798.
55 Id.
56 In a companion work-in-progress, the author is exploring the nature of the competing narratives
that underlie this doctrine. In part, the author seeks to assess the power of the underlying assumption,
and why the courts seemingly have been seduced to perpetuate a myth about human motivation and
discrimination in society more generally.
5' Proud, 945 F.3d at 798. A recent Ninth Circuit decision exemplifies how the inference
operates in the context of the McDonnell Douglas framework, heightening the burden for plaintiffs in
Title VII cases. Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
discussion supra note 33. In Coghlan, the Ninth Circuit explained that a plaintiffs "burden is
especially steep... because of the so-called 'same actor inference."' Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1096.
58 This Part is a subpart of a companion work-in-progress, wherein the author tracks the migration
of this doctrine across the circuits, analyzes how it interacts with the landscape of employment
discrimination jurisprudence including the McDonnell Douglas framework, Reeves and Desert Palace,
and demonstrates its debilitating effects on plaintiffs throughout the litigation process, particularly at
the summary judgment stage. See supra note 62.
59 As of 1996, the only circuits that had neither recognized nor issued an opinion on the inference
were the Second and the Eleventh Circuits.
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role in relation to all other evidence. The majority of those circuits,
however, granted this evidence a more prominent position in the analytical
framework, making it particularly difficult for plaintiffs to prove
discrimination.
When the Fourth Circuit established this principle, its formulation
delineated what seemed like clear parameters for its application.
Specifically, in Proud, the court stated that "in cases where the hirer and
the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs
within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse
action taken by the employer.' '60 Notwithstanding the fundamentally faulty
nature of the inference in my view, the court seemed to contemplate a
fairly narrow set of circumstances from which a fact finder could assess
discriminatory motivation violative of Title VII. In Proud, the same
person both hired and fired the plaintiff within a span of only four months.
The following year in a case decided shortly after Proud, the Eighth
Circuit extended the interval to two years in another age discrimination
case. 61  Thus, in only a matter of months, courts began expanding the
narrow parameters articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Proud.
Instead of confining the doctrine to a particularized set of
circumstances, Proud ignited a phenomenon whose effects are far-
reaching. An overview of some of the extensions that are most
problematic follows.
62
1. Time Interval
Theoretically, the short time interval between hiring and firing presents
the most appealing aspect of the doctrine's rationale. Despite the reasons
why an employer hires a candidate initially, any negative action taken
against that individual by the same decision-maker shortly thereafter raises
at least a plausible case that discriminatory motive was absent.63 In my
60 Proud, 945 F.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
61 See Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 175 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying the same-
actor doctrine to its analysis of plaintiff's claim of age discrimination). This Eighth Circuit opinion is
often cited as a companion case to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Proud. In the court's view, the
same-actor parameters--"[t]he short time plaintiff worked for the defendant, his age when hired, and
the identity of those who hired and fired him"-proved fatal to plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Id.
The court stated that, "[i]t is simply incredible. . . that the company officials who hired [the plaintiff] at
age fifty-one had suddenly developed an aversion to older people less than two years later." Id.
62 While this Article focuses on a few of the extensions I consider most problematic, I expand my
exploration of these and other bases for the evolution of the doctrine in a current work-in-progress,
Debunking the Myth ofDiscriminatory Animus under Title VII Law: Plaintiffs 'Plight Against the Same
Actor Doctrine. This companion piece should be seen as a prequel more closely tracking the migration
of the doctrine across the circuits and analyzing its relationship to recent developments under Title VII
jurisprudence. This endeavor assesses the use of this doctrine at various stages of the litigation process,
with particular focus on the summary judgment stage, and it offers a prescription for reigning in this
wayward doctrine.
63 See, e.g., Herr v. Airborne Freight Corp., 130 F.3d 359, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
same-actor evidence raised a strong inference against discrimination when plaintiffs last work
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view, it is this aspect of the doctrine that makes it palatable as a starting
point for engagement. The persuasiveness of same-actor evidence loses
force, however, as the time interval expands.64 The longer the interval, the
more tenuous the argument becomes. While the original expression of the
principle involved a shorter time frame, subsequently, the courts expanded
it to as much as seven years.65 While no reported circuit court decision has
applied the inference against a plaintiff beyond the seven years, many have
applied it well beyond the Proud and Lowe standards.66 Moreover, the
courts are inconsistent as to what amount of time constitutes a short time
frame. Thus, the manner in which the courts have applied and expanded
the time frame reflects nothing more than lip service to the rationale of
Proud's focus on the brevity of the interval between positive and negative
employment decisions.
assignment occurred sixteen days after her first one); Brown v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 113 F.3d
139, 142 (8th Cir. 1997) (deemed ."simply incredible' that same decision-maker would engage in
discriminationfive months after hiring plaintiff).
6 While the short time frame application of the inference appears less problematic at first blush,
the rub emanates from the court's discretion in determining what constitutes a short time interval. Such
malleability leaves room for expanding the circumstances under which the inference applies. A recent
case exemplifies this tension. In Daub v. Eagle Test Systems, Inc., a California federal court declared
that "four years is still considered a short time," and "not so long a time as to [weaken] the
presumption." Daub v. Eagle Test Sys., Inc., No. C-05-01055, 2006 WL 3782877, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2006) (unpublished order granting employer's motion for summary judgment). See also Houk
v. Peoploungers, Inc., 214 F. App'x 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2007) (claim of age discrimination deemed
"tenuous" where plaintiff was fired "only a year and a half after he was hired" by one of the same
managers involved in his discharge); Robinson v. American Acryl NA, No. H-06-570, 2007 WL
471121, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2007) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that inference inapplicable
because a little less than four years is too long a time interval); Myers v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 3:05-
CV-511, 2007 WL 230100, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2007) (deeming same-actor inference very
strong where, within a span of eighteen months, one of the decision makers, before firing plaintiff,
promoted her twice and gave her good performance evaluations). But cf Garrett v. Garden City Hotel,
Inc., No. 05-CV-0962, 2007 WL 1174891, at *6, 15 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. April 19, 2007) (deeming same-
actor inference less compelling where a "significant period of time" of four years elapsed between
promotion and firing).
65 Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1998) (same-actor
inference relevant when plaintiff was fired seven years after being hired); Buhrmaster v. Ovemite
Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (opining that a jury could draw the inference when the
length of time between the hiring and firing was seven and a half years because it is possible that an
employer who has nothing against women when hires them, has nothing against women when fires
them, "regardless of the number of years that pass") (emphasis added). But cf Carlton v. Mystic
Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The seven years between [plaintiff's] hiring and firing
significantly weakens the same-actor inference.").
6 See, e.g., Williams v. Vitro Services, Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1440 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (reversing
summary judgment in favor of employer and declining to accord same-actor evidence presumptive
value where eleven-year interval existed between rehiring and second reduction in force); Hansen v.
Clark County, No. 2:05-CV-672, 2007 WL 1892127, at **2-3, 8 (D. Nev. June 27, 2007) (seven years;
same-actor evidence creates strong inference of non discrimination); Hollingsworth v. Henry County
Med. Ctr. EMS, Inc., No. 05-1272 B, 2007 WL 1695303, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. June 12, 2007) (six years
interval). See also Mitchell v. Superior Court of Cal., San Mateo, Nos. C 04-3135 VRW, C 04-3301
VRW, 2007 WL 1655626, at **14-15 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2007) (refusing to extend the time period that
same actor inference applies to thirteen years, but agreeing with "the Coghlan opinion's logic that
evidence that a particular actor has developed a bias during the interval should be regarded as more
relevant than the length of that interval in defeating the same actor inference .... ").
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2. Same Decision-Maker
At its inception, Proud required consistency in the decision-maker, that
is, that the hiring and firing be initiated by the same individual.67 This
element has been significantly broadened as well. Many courts have
retreated from requiring the existence of a direct relationship between the
decision-maker and the employee. 6' Thus, the courts have applied the
inference to employment decisions involving multiple decision-makers,
where more than one individual has input into the worker's fate.69 A larger
number of the more recent cases present multiple decision-maker
scenarios, which mirror the prevalence of team work and collective
processing in contemporary work settings. For example, courts have been
willing to apply the inference where even a co-worker influenced the
decision-making process or otherwise engaged in the circumstances
involving the employee. 70  This extension is perhaps one of the most
67 Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1991).
" As long as the decisions were made by the same organization or division, courts have applied
the inference. See, e.g., Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995)
(indicating that hirer-firer identity satisfied if the same company involved in both decisions); Birkbeck
v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that a direct relationship
between individual hirer and the plaintiff is not necessary to establish the inference so long as the firing
official has hired others in plaintiff's protected class); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173,
174 (8th Cir. 1992) (considering evidence that "same people" or "same company officials" hired and
fired plaintiff in less that two years "compelling". . . in light of the weakness of the plaintiff's evidence
otherwise").
69 See, e.g., Houk v. Peoploungers Inc., 214 F. App'x 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that
plaintiff was hired by one of the same managers that was ultimately involved in firing him) (emphasis
added); Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the same actor
inference because one of the members of the tenure committee was instrumental in both hiring and
firing the plaintiff, and noting that an inference against discrimination on that member's part existed,
even if limited) (emphasis added); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting that "[m]ost of the same individuals-including Johnson-who decided to terminate
Antonio for job abandonment had also hired her twice"); Jetter v. Knothe Corp., 324 F.3d 73, 74-75
(2d Cir. 2003) (noting that four individual defendants, in addition to the defendant corporation, were
involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff) (emphasis added); Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works,
Inc., 67 F. App'x 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that Mr. Lamb and Ms. Phillips were the sole actors
involved in plaintiff's hiring and termination, and that under the same actor inference, "the fact that the
same person or group ofpeople did both the hiring and firing over a short time frame is strong evidence
that there was no discrimination involved in the later termination") (emphasis added); Waterhouse v.
District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding persuasive the fact that the same group of
management officials who hired plaintiff also fired her only a short time before, thereby raising a
presumption or inference of non-discrimination); Lewis v. 20th-82nd Judicial Dist. Juvenile Prob.
Dep't, 190 F.3d 538, No. 99-50189, 1999 WL 642898, at *3 n.I (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Mr. Ortega
terminated the plaintiff, but that Mr. Ortega performed the termination at the instruction of Ms.
Dillenberger); Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 1999)
(noting that plaintiff's expulsion from the medical program was recommended by the Residency Review
Committee, composed of members of the medical staff) (emphasis added); Williams v. Vitro Servs.
Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1442-43 (11 th Cir. 1998) (noting that the employer has pointed to evidence that
the same individual was responsible for both positive and negative employment actions toward the
plaintiff, while at the same time acknowledging that the evidence shows that the same individual was
involved with these actions and identifying other individuals that were also involved in these decisions)
(emphasis added).70 See, e.g., Jean-Baptiste v. K-Z, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d. 652, 665 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
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troubling because it fails to account for the complexity of work structures
and institutional practices characteristic of the modem workplace, namely
team work and collective decision-making. 7' For example, a decision-
maker may receive input from a biased team member or become privy to
information suggesting bias by someone who can potentially influence the
the decision. Ferreting discriminatory motive becomes a more difficult task
when a decision-maker receives input data from others regarding an
employee.72 While some courts have acknowledged the intricacies of bias
in layered work settings, their awareness has not spurred the collective
following to significantly weaken the nature of the doctrine.73
3. Same Protected Category
In an equally troubling variation of the decision-maker expansion
highlighted above, courts have deemed the inference strengthened when
the same-actor belongs to the same protected class as the plaintiff7 4 or hires
another in the same protected category as the plaintiff.75  The rationale is
7' Not only have the courts significantly loosened their formulation of the inference with respect
to the same-actor requirement, they have invoked the principle in situations where there exists
ambiguity about the role of the alleged discriminator in the favorable treatment and the alleged adverse
action. See, e.g., Nieto v. L & H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
plaintiff was hired based on the recommendation of a supervisor and it was this same supervisor that
recommended that the plaintiffs employment be terminated). This variation provides a more
fundamental diversion from the premise of Proud. To augment the doctrine where the circumstances
leave some doubt-not only about the identity of the decision-maker but even whether that person
provides the continuity that is so fundamental to the doctrine's underlying assumption-adds to the
doctrine's suspect nature.
72 Part III of the Article more fully explores this premise with respect to the structural,
operational, and cultural terms. For example, Part III engages this doctrine in an exploration of various
work structures and evaluative models used in the workplace. Moreover, the manner in which the
courts have loosened the parameters with regard to the actors involved, contradicts other recent
developments under Title VII. Specifically, the cat's paw theory recognizes, to some degree, the
complexities of the decision-making process. Under this doctrine, courts acknowledge the influence of
biased individuals beyond the putative decision-maker. This doctrine is based on the notion that bias
may reside outside the actual decision-maker, but infect the process nonetheless. Shager v. Upjohn
Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
73 See infra Part III, which maps the doctrine to the contemporary workplace realities including
work structures, evaluative models, and powerful relational forces that affect decision-making
processing and bears on motivation.
74 See, e.g., Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (opining that the
inference that discrimination was not the motive for an employer's action is strengthened when the
same-actor is also in plaintiff's class); Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 2:05CV388, 2007 WL
465664, at *9 n.25 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2007) (citing Brown for this same proposition); Robinson v.
American Acryl NA, No. H-06-570, 2007 WL 471121, at *1, *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2007) (applying
presumptive value to same-actor evidence where the one decision-maker belongs to the same racial
category as plaintiff and another is over forty like plaintiff); cf. Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138,
155 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the assertion that "an inference of discrimination cannot be drawn because
[plaintiff] was fired by another Jew").
75 See, e.g., Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that
as long as the decision-maker has hired others in plaintiff's protected class, a showing of a direct
relationship between the decision-maker and the plaintiff is unnecessary); Collins v. Sailormen Inc.,
512 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507 (W.D. La. 2007) (holding no discrimination occurred when five of the six
managers who reported to plaintiff's boss were black). However, in a recent Sixth Circuit decision, the
court declined to accept this same-group version of the inference as a mandatory inference. Wexler v.
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similar to that of the same-actor inference-that a member of the same
protected class is unlikely to harbor bias against one of the same class.
This seems to be in contravention of Supreme Court authority reflecting
the fact that plaintiff and her replacement are in the same protected is
generally irrelevant to the search for intentional motive.76
Without a doubt, the same-actor doctrine has experienced quite a
transformation in a short period of time. A pithy phrase with one-liner
doctrine has swept the circuits, establishing a formidable presence in the
employment discrimination jurisprudence. We should be particularly
concerned in light of the realities of the modem workplace, as explored in
Part III. Using same-actor evidence as a decision-making apparatus with
respect to claims of unlawful workplace treatment, courts avoid thinking
about discrimination in any real sense, reducing the complex inquiry to an
insufficient shorthand reference. Through reflexive and unrestrained
application of this doctrine, the courts have subverted notions of equality
and diversity in the American workplace.
III. THE MODERN WORKPLACE-IT Is A WHOLE NEW WORLD
There is no question that the structure of our workplaces has changed
tremendously over the last several decades. This is due in part to the
growth of global initiatives, technological advances, the changing
demographic of the available labor pools, and target customer bases. 7 As
recognized by several legal scholars including Professors Linda Hamilton-
Krieger, Susan Sturm, Cheryl Wade, and Tristin Green, the modem
workplace is a tangled web of complex human, institutional, structural, and
cultural dimensions.78 Additionally, business scholars offer an array of
White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). In Wexler, the primary decision-maker
was older than the plaintiff. The court's rejection may well soften the blow of the same-actor
inference, but the inference remains viable under the court's view. Willing to accept that one's
brethren could discriminate against one another, the court is less convinced that the same-actor could
engage in biased behavior. The court seems to stretch this logic.
76 See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (unanimous
opinion holding that "[the] fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in
the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost because of [his status in the protected
class]"). The trend in the lower courts reflects a heeding of the Court's view on this issue. See, e.g.,
Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). Some courts have
recognized exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied sub nom, 526 U.S. 1099 (denoting some circumstances when it would apply an exception
to this rule).
7 See generally THE NEW MODERN TIMES: FACTORS RESHAPING THE WORLD OF WORK (David
B. Bills ed. 1995); see also Catherine Romano, Managing Change, Diversity and Emotions, MGMT.
REV., July 1995, at 6 (highlighting that a significant percentage of American companies are
transforming their business including in three major areas-information technology (84.2 %), process
reengineering (80.3%) and strategic planning (65.6%)); H. Weiss, Managing in a Changing World,
SUPERVISION, 2006, at 1, 17-20 (exploring the challenge or companies to remain viable in a globally
competitive marketplace).
's See generally Green, supra note 10; Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93
CAL. L. REv. 623 (2005); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001); Susan Sturm,
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literature on the transformation of the American workplace, documenting
successes and failures as businesses adjust strategies and structure to
ensure their viability.
79
This Part lays the ground work for my thesis that the same-actor
doctrine fails to comport with the realities of the contemporary workplace.
Specifically, exploration of three aspects of contemporary work
environments-work structure, evaluative models, and relational
dynamics-illuminates the social complexity of organizations, and
demonstrates how these facets serve as vectors for the injection of bias into
the decision-making process between the time an individual is hired and
fired, or otherwise subjected to adverse treatment.
A. Corporate Structures and Evaluative Models
The manner in which organizational goals are accomplished through
the utilization of human capital has expanded from a seemingly
individualistic endeavor to a team-based collaborative. Increased variation
in the conceptions of work produces changes in the decision-making
processes within work environments. Employers have replaced
hierarchical and vertical decision trees with more horizontal and collective
processing.80 Additionally, the emergence and salience of workplace
culture impact significantly interaction among workers and the motivations
of decision-makers. The use of such workplace management tools causes
one to question the validity of the same-actor inference.
1. Organizing around Work Teams
To reenergize the American workforce, and thereby increase
productivity, American companies began experimenting with new business
tools, including the use of work groups or self-directed work teams in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.8 1 At this time, American companies contended
with the increase of foreign competition from their Japanese and European
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458
(2001); Susan Sturm, supra note 10; Cheryl L. Wade, "We Are an Equal Opportunity Employer":
Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541 (2004).
79 See, e.g., Yves Doz & Mikko Kosonen, The New Deal at the Top, HARV. Bus. REV., June
2007, at 98, 98-104 (discussing how companies transform from the top down by alterning business
strategies and employing business models that stress collective responsibility and collobaration);
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Transforming Giants, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan. 2008, at 43, 43-52
(demonstrating the effect of global corporations' use of "internal guidance systems" that promote
autonomy of workers on the front lines).
80 Id; see also Aleksander P. J. Ellis et al., Team Learning: Collectively Connecting the Dots, 88
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 821, 821-35 (2003); John R. Hollenbeck et al., Multilevel Theory of Team
Decision Making: Decision Performance in Teams Incorporating Distributed Expertise, 80 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 292, 292-316 (1995).
", While there is documented use of the work team concept as early as the 1960s, work teams
were not mainstreamed into the American workplace until nearly a decade later. This was after
Japanese businesses reflected major success with work team implementation and use. See JACK
ORSBURN ET AL., SELF-DIRECTED WORK TEAMS: THE NEW AMERICAN CHALLENGE 13-14 (1990).
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counterparts abroad. Attempting to amass the building blocks to revitalize
their businesses and become a force within the global economy, American
businesses awakened to their human problem--pervasive workplace
discord marked by low employee morale. In short, American workers felt
devalued, mismanaged, and unrewarded.82 Without productive human
capital, American businesses could not compete, let alone lead, in a global
market characterized by a level of quickness and pliability antithetical to
post-World War American business operations. To accommodate the
evolving norms of business strategy, transformation took place in worker
utilization and workplace management, including the use of self-directed
work teams and collective decision-making processes.
A hallmark of the self-directed work team is a mass of active, rather
than passive workers. That is, distinct from the conventional manner in
which businesses utilized workers, work teams resulted in
"institutionalized participation" of the workforces. 83  Through cross-
functional training, and information and resource sharing, for example,
organizations empower employees to take ownership interest in corporate
success. No longer responsible for task-specific assignments or functions,
work teams command the entire work flow process from beginning to end.
Since they share equal responsibility for producing a finished product, each
member fully vests in the work, which breeds a sense of entitlement,
ownership, and greater overall job satisfaction.84 Such integration affords
employees greater decision-making authority over their daily work
activities, problem solving, and interpersonal issues.85
Not only do self-directed work teams serve as tactical directors for
business goals, but they also supplant many of the functions of supervisors
and middle managers, such as handling personnel matters like hiring and
performance-related discipline. 86 As a self-directed work team evolves, the
supervisor or manager recedes into the backdrop. 87 The team charts its
82 This strife illuminated the ineffectiveness of the American legacy of corporate bureaucracy,
hierarchical work structures, and rigid operations. The conundrum for American companies became
how to motivate the workforce, and thereby provide quality goods and services, all while minimizing
costs.
83 ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 13.
4Id. at 13-16.
85 For example, work teams "solve problems, schedule and assign work, and in many cases handle
personnel issues like absenteeism or even team selection and evaluation." Id. at 8-9.
86 See, e.g., RICHARD S. WELLINS ET AL., SELF-DIRECTED TEAMS: A STUDY OF CURRENT
PRACTICE 23-25 (1990) (showing that self-directed teams aid in "[h]andl[ing] individual performance
problems" and "[s]elect[ing] team members"); Richard Saavedra & Seog K. Kwan, Peer Evaluation in
Self-Managing Work Groups, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 450, 459-60 (1993) (discussing the advantages
of using peer evaluations in work group settings); see also Andrew Pollard, The Emergence of Self-
Directed Work Teams and Their Effect on Title V11 Law, Comment, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 933 (2000)
(discussing the rise and operation of work teams and commenting that a team "may control the
production process, hiring, promotions, discipline, evaluations, and layoffs").
87 The self-regulatory nature of organizations in cultural terms presents positive attributes
undeniable to anyone familiar with supervising individuals. In particular, a strong corporate culture
frees up managers and supervisors, disposing of the need for micro-managerial techniques. See, e.g.,
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own path, sometimes awkwardly, through the current of daily work life.88
Thus, they are sustained only by their individual involvement and
collective strength and judgment.
Through work teams of any type, employees, released from the reigns
of micromanagement strategies, embrace their independence. This
emancipation from bureaucracy enlivens workers, and greatly increases
productivity and effectiveness. 89  Notwithstanding the sense of self-
determination and control manifested through work teams, such highly
integrated business structures require tremendous collaboration,
coordination, and the exercise of collective judgment by team members.90
This simultaneous independence and interdependence among team
members hails as its strength. Yet, it is precisely this interplay that breeds
tension in work groups allowing bias to manifest and stifle an individual's
upward mobility. Once the terms and conditions of a worker's
employment no longer depend on the relationship with an individual
manager, interpersonal dynamics become more integral to one's
employability. The juxtaposition of such systematic evaluative models and
the informal relational context in which they exist present challenging
workplace dynamics.9'
The metamorphosis of conventional employees into self-directed work
groups is a process all its own. The various stages of transition of work
teams, from concept to maturity, present challenges in human engagement
and management. From organizational research, we know the life cycle of
teams begins with initial encounters in which members seek to orient
themselves in terms of role and function within the unit.92 Studies reflect
that these initial encounters involve reciprocal information exchange, self-
Jennifer A. Chatman & Sandra Eunyoung Cha, Leading by Leveraging Culture, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV.
20, 24 (2003). This attribute is not without risk, however. Empowerment of workers through the
phenomenon of organizational culture leaves employees to their own devices, often with the unfettered
discretion to wield upon any number of workplace matters. For further discussion on the relational
dynamics in workplace decision-making, see infra Part I.B.2. See also Green, supra note 78, at 643-
46 (offering examples of the ways in which culture can manifest discrimination).
88 In work team environments, the role of the traditional manager and supervisor can take many
forms. Depending upon the level of autonomy of the organization's teams, the supervisor may serve as
a technical consultant, facilitator, or coach. In fact, the supervisor may serve in a transitional role and
phase out altogether. ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 17-19. (discussing the transition process for
supervisors and middle managers in self directing work team environments).
89 Self-directed work groups may also emerge through employee self-initiative. Employees may
organize themselves into networks around particular common interests, expertise, or experiences. Such
informal work groups have become known as "communities of practice," and "quality circles." See
Green, supra note 10, at 103 n.53. Technological advances, such as the internet, email conclaves,
blogs, and listservs, have assisted such groupings. See id
90 For more information regarding the evolution process of teams and team performance see SIMS,
JR. & LORENZ, supra note 2, at 209-13.
91 For more discussion of work team conflicts, see Part ll.B. See generally Karen A. Jehn,
Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity: A New Form of Organizing in the Twenty-
First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 473 (1998) (exploring conflict within work teams
and identifying potential personality clashes).92 See ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 18-23.
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disclosure, and more chivalrous engagement as excitement about the joint
venture builds amongst team members.93 As the transition is underway,
the organization invests in cross-training to equip each member of the team
with the necessary skills to contribute to team effort.94 Such training
enhances the team's technical, communication, and administrative skills.9s
By organizing work around teams, employers create environments that
energize workers, enhance productivity, and encourage commitment to
company goals, including sustained quality output and customer
satisfaction. 96  The full transformation of workers into self-directed work
teams requires interdependence and takes time.
97
Like other social and functional units, work groups reflect the deeply
held assumptions, beliefs, and values of its members. Thus, the
interdependence of work groups produces a "system of shared values
(defining what is important) and norms (defining the appropriate attitudes
and behaviors)." 98  This complex and powerful force is known in the
organizational behavioral and management worlds as corporate culture. It
is this cultural overlay that commands the climate of any organization and
group, setting expectations, influencing organizational learning, and
informing attitudes and behaviors.
The essential nature of culture is its deeply embedded, unconscious
shared learning. 99 These shared assumptions become ingrained in the fabric
of organization or group life-it's "DNA," and it thrives as it is passed on
to new members, shaping the way they think, feel, and act. 100 At its core,
93 See Bradley J. Alge et al., When Does the Medium Matter? Knowledge-building Experiences
and Opportunities in Decision-making Teams, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PROCESSES 26,
27 (2003) (citing C.R. Berger, Beyond Initial Ineraction: Uncertainty, Understanding, and the
Development ofInterpersonal Relationships, in LANGUAGE & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 122, 122 (Howard
Giles & Robert N. St. Claire eds. 1979)). For additional general information on organizational
socialization, group bonding, and norm development, see generally Kenneth Bettenhausen & J. Keith
Murnighan, Emergence of Norms in Competitive Decision-Making Groups, 30 ADMIN. SC. Q. 350
(1985).
94 ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 19.
95
Id. at 18-19.
96Id. at 14-17.
97 Transitioning employees into work groups includes several stages. One author has identified
five stages in team transformation: Start Up, State of Confusion, Leader-Centered Teams, Tightly
Formed Teams and Self-Directed Teams. ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 19.
981d. at21.
9 Renowned social science scholar Edgar H. Schein makes the amorphous quality of corporate
culture accessible. Acknowledging the abstract quality of organizational culture, Schein provides a
helpful framework for understanding the powerful phenomenon at play in work groups and
organizations. According to Schein, because organizations are made up of various groups of
individuals, it is inevitable that culture will form in work life. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 1-2 (3d ed. 2004). Management literature also reflects that organizations
desire to enhance organizational productivity through the strategic use of culture. In the business
world, managing corporate culture and effective leadership of people in organizations are intertwined,
and in the views of some, they are synonymous. An article by scholar Jennifer Chatman illuminates the
entrenchment of culture within organizations and its effect on corporate strategy and decision-making.
In her article, she effectively relays the meaning of culture, how it develops, and how culture best
utilized by organizations to motivate workers. See Chatman & Cha, supra note 87, at 20-34.
100 SCHEIN, supra note 99, at 21-23.
[Vol. 40:1117
HeinOnline  -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1142 2007-2008
organizational culture operates as a form of social control. The established
norms, if violated, can "produce discomfort, anxiety, ostracism, and
eventually excommunication."' 0  The normative aspects of a strong
workplace culture affect the manner in which group members perceive,
engage, "approach decisions, and solve problems."' 0 2 Once the climate of
an organization is defined, basic assumptions are transmitted and
entrenched. Employers expect employees to interpret the values and add
their own layers of meaning to them, taking ownership to create additional
extensions of the culture.
10 3
In an attempt to integrate, cohabit, and effectively function within
organizations, culture becomes a self-generating and self-regulating
paradigm, whether for the good or bad of an organization. Because
organizational identity is mirrored through its culture, work groups act to
preserve that identity because it is the stabilizer in the midst of the daily
chaos of work life-marked by deadlines, negotiations, meetings, travel,
budgets, and the like. Simply, it is the force around which goals are
strategized, articulated, and executed.1' 4 So even, as employers organize
around teams, emphasize collaboration, and move workers around, a strong
corporate culture maintains its power because it is deeply embedded,
unconscious, and self-perpetuating. Organizational culture survives
physical, cosmetic, and personnel changes within groups.'0 5
The interdependency of work groups combined with the fluid platform
upon which culture operates in organizations manifests self-regulated
workplace environments. Employee-on-employee policing replaces hands-
on management within the workplace. 10 6  As organizational literature
reflects, individuals are not only motivated to be productive, but to ensure
that their fellow co-workers are as well. Strong corporate cultures cultivate
a kind of familial tie so strong that an employee engages in behavior that
'0' Id. at 16.
'02 Jennifer A. Chatman et al., Being Different Yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of Demographic
Composition and Organizational Cutlure on Work Processes and Outcomes, 43 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 749,
751 (1998).
103 The danger is that such basic assumptions become normalized such that a group member who
does not hold them is deemed foreign, or downright "crazy," and "automatically dismissed. SCHEIN,
supra note 99, at 25.
" See id. at 14 (stating that "[c]ulture is pervasive; it influences all aspects of how an
organization deals with its primary task, its various environments, and its internal operations").
'05 See id. (stating that "culture survives even when some members of the organization depart");
see also generally Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOCIOL.
326 (1998) (discussing the transfer of organizational memory notwithstanding the passage of time and
attrition).
'06 See, e.g., James R. Barker, Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing
Teams, 38 ADMIN Sci. Q. 408, 425 (1993) (studying the emergence of norms in self-managing team
settings and accounting the effect of "concertive control" on team perceptions of group members and
their responsive behavior).
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preserves his place in the community. 107 Not wanting to "let down" fellow
workers or be shunned from a social unit, such as a work team, employees
conform and cloak themselves in the fabric of that particular organizational
culture. 0 8  Thus, corporate cultures that are strategically relevant allow
employers to replicate a particular identity and atmosphere despite
turnover or movement. 1 09
2. Collective Decision-making and Peer Assessments
With remodeled work structures and enhanced utilization of workers,
the decision-making process within the American workplace has evolved.
Characteristic of an integrated workplace is collective decision-making.
As legal and business scholars have documented, multiple players now
make or influence a significant amount of personnel decisions."0 For
instance, before a worker is hired, promoted, or discharged, several people
have shared their input about this individual's future within an
organization. Thus, more collective decision-making has become
implanted into the operational protocol of determining the terms and
conditions of a worker's livelihood.
The use of flattening techniques like self-directed work teams and
other group configurations affects the manner in which employers evaluate
and reward workers. One's job security often resides in the hands of a
collective rather than any particular supervisor. For example, such
practices include 360-degree reviews that involve input from a spectrum of
those affected by an employee's job performance, from supervisors to
customers."' These comprehensive reviews may include some aspect of
self-critique, but the most striking aspect of this approach is the layered
107 See generally Helen Bernhard et al., Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement, 96
AM. ECON. REv. 217 (2006) (discussing the social norm setting and enforcement based on group
affilation).
108 In managing culture beyond selection of individuals who "fit," organizations focus on
socialization through orienting and training, processes not mutually exclusive of selection. Much has
been written about this socialization process through which individuals acquire knowledge about
values, expected behavior, and social mores of an institution or group. Organizations begin creating
loyalty from the outset, ensuring that newcomers bond with others in the organization. Once the
individual identifies with the new environment, the individual will work hard to uphold the
organizational norms. In fact, some organizations go to great lengths to build cohesiveness. For some
illustrations of organizations striving towards strong cultures, see Chatman & Cha, supra note 87, at
28-29.
'9 Culture within organizations is deeply ingrained such that it is sustained even where changes
in personnel persist. See generally SCHEIN, supra note 99.
110 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 78.
1 See ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at chs. 12 & 17 (presenting a model for the operation of a
peer disciplinary review committee and peer performance appraisals within a organizations). See also
Green, supra note 10, at 103 n.59; Michael M. Harris & John Schaubroeck, A Meta Analysis of Self-
Supervisor, Self-Peer, and Peer-Supervisor Ratings, 41 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 43-62 (1988); Sue
Bowness, Full-Circle Feedback, PROFIT, May 2006, at 77, available at LEXIS, News Library,
CANPRF File (use of multi-rater reviews as 360-degree reviews for leaders in organizations); Make
Employee Appraisals More Productive, HR Focus, Sept. 2007, at 1, 11, 13-15 (suggestions from Paul
Falcone, a human resources executive for Nickelodeon Studios, for improving performance
evaluations).
[Vol. 40:1117
HeinOnline  -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1144 2007-2008
nature of the appraisal. Employers have even resorted to more
controversial evaluative models such as ranking and grading systems, and
even unstructured review processes."12  Additionally, an employee's
compensation or advancement may be based, in whole or in part, on peer
review. 1 3  The use and prevalence of peer-to-peer assessments often
emanates from employers' search for evaluative models that comport with
the structural changes and evolving mores of team-based work." 4 Through
frequent engagement in team meetings and other collaboration, team
members possess first-hand knowledge of a worker's contributions,
strengths and weaknesses, unlike a supervisor or manager now removed
from the core of the workers' daily existence.1 5 Thus, as Professor Green
has noted, performance evaluations are "more decentralized, subjective and
contextual."' 
16
Employment discrimination scholars including Professors Krieger,
Selmi, and McGinley have engaged the complexities of multiple-actor
decision-making in relation to the analytical paradigm of disparate
treatment cases under Title VII." 7 In her article, Whose Motive Matters?
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, Professor
Krieger asserts, rather convincingly, that the factual inquiry in a disparate
treatment case, for example, should be whether an individual's race, sex,
gender, disability, etc., played a role in the employer's decision. 1 8 Krieger
sharpens her lens on multiple decision-making processes to advocate that a
search of the elusive intention is seemingly futile in a group decision-
making context. Exploring comparisons of vertical (i.e. up-the-chain) and
horizontal (i.e. group) decision-making processes, Krieger captures the
essence of this quandary-that one should not mistake the absence of
animus with lack of intentionality due to the subtleties of bias, particularly
112 See, e.g., Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The
Courts' Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 281 (1994);
Reed Abelson, Companies Turn to Grades, and Employees Go To Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001,
at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
113 See ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 321. See also Saavedra & Kwun, supra note 86, at
450, 460.
114 See Green, supra note 10, at 103-04 (explaining the rise and prevalence of peer review
models).
115 See DALE E. YEATTS & CLOYD HYTEN, HIGH-PERFORMING SELF-MANAGED WORK TEAMS: A
COMPARISON OF THEORY TO PRACTICE 77-102 (1998) (highlighting how peer appraisals assist
companies in leveraging their workers in a manner that produces competitive advantage).
116 Green, supra note 10, at 103.
117 In this context, these scholars have commented on Title VlI's obsession with the search for
conscious intentionality to find unlawful discrimination. For example, Professor Selmi suggests that
the inquest should not revolve around the search for the conscious state of mind of a particular decision
maker, but whether a protected characteristic made a difference in the decision-making process. See
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination : The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO.
L. J. 279, 289 (1997); see also Bridgeman, supra note 7, at 267; McGinley, supra note 9, at 478-79;
White & Krieger, supra note 78, at 498; see generally Krieger, supra note 9.
118 White & Krieger, supra note 78, at 498.
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in collective decision-making processes" 19 I agree with Krieger and others
who acknowledge that conscious intentionality has little to do with
discrimination, particularly in workplace settings comprised of complex
individual and group dynamics.
While groups do not think, per se, group members are influenced by
group membership. In light of this, Krieger's prescription of a causation
inquiry, for example, where the plaintiff need only show that the protected
characteristic was at play in the decision-making process seems
appropriate. 120  Even in this regard, however, plaintiffs are somewhat
disadvantaged due to the complexities of workplace structures like work
teams and group decision-making processes. The reality is that the root of
the discrimination remains concealed in the web of modem workplace
design, including work teams and collective decision-making processes.
As observed in Part I, courts have been willing to allow employers an
inference against discrimination under the same-actor doctrine when the
same group of decision makers was involved. 12 1  In fact, courts have
allowed employers the use of the inference even where the decision arises
from the same work group, such as a department or division, albeit one
with different players at the time the adverse employment decision takes
place. 122 What gives the courts such assurance that discrimination fails to
1"9 See id. at 502. With respect to collective decision-making, in particular, Professor Krieger
advocates that Title VII's intent requirement is more appropriately deemed a search for causation rather
than conscious discrimination. Id at 499-501. In this article, Krieger explores the case of Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), as an example of how the Supreme Court
sidestepped the issues of discriminatory intent in cases involving multiple decision-makers. In Reeves,
the discharge of plaintiff emanated from both vertical recommendation and horizontal (group) process.
Id at 137-38. The person who actually fired the plaintiff was not the same individual who the Court
deemed to harbor discriminatory animus through actions including age-biased remarks. Id at 151-52.
Notwithstanding the lack of apparent intention by the ultimate decision-maker, the Court deemed that
the person harboring unlawful animus was also an actual decision-maker. Id. at 151-54.120 See White & Krieger, supra note 78, at 498.
121 See, e.g., Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (deeming it
persuasive that the same group of management officials who fired plaintiff also fired her only a short
time before, thereby raising a presumption or inference of non-discrimination); Buhrmaster v. Ovemite
Transp. Corp., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1995) (perceiving it as "'simply incredible . . . that the
company officials who hired [an employee] at age fifty-one had suddenly developed an aversion to
older people two years later'); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding it critical to the inquiry that the "same people" who hired plaintiff also fired him). See also
discussion infra Part III.
122 See, e.g., Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that
"[miost of the same individuals-including Johnson-who decided to terminate Antonio for job
abandonment had also hired her twice") (emphasis added); Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-
Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314, 317-21 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that plaintiff's expulsion from the residency
program was recommended by the Residency Review Committee, composed of members of the
medical staff, while the positive decision that is cited was made only by one individual, Dr. McDonald,
who granted plaintiff's request to stay in the residency program for an additional year); Nieto v. L&H
Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1997) (addressing the identity of the decision makers and
accepting the argument that organization decisions often made by management groups); Lowe, 963
F.2d at 174 (finding "compelling" evidence that "same people" or "same company officials" hired and
fired plaintiff in less than two years). There have been a few instances, however, when the courts
express unwillingness to apply the inference when the players are different. See, e.g., Chuang v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. CIV-$97-0613, 1998 WL 1671745, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 1998)
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operate under these circumstances? It is precisely this intergroup
configuration and its attendant socio-cultural phenomena that can serve to
camouflage the discriminatory bias. 2 3 Multi-level decision-making snarls
the quest of motive and undercuts the psychological assumption of Proud.
As addressed in the next subpart, advances in organizational behavior,
management theory, and organizational culture analysis assist in clarifying
just how incompatible the same-actor doctrine is with the modem
workplace.
24
Retooling through the implementation of work teams, flattened
organizational structures, and collective evaluative processes empowers
workers to meaningfully participate in their work-life destinies and the
trajectory of an organization like never before. The use of such
organizational structures and institutional practices is pervasive in
contemporary work environments. While the various tools appear
cooperative, healthy, and productive, they can be laced with a social-
relational force far more powerful and potentially volatile than any five-
point review conducted by a single manager. For example, by their nature,
work teams serve as a structural stimulant that produces complex
behavioral patterns and inter-relational phenomena, due largely to social
and cultural forces inherent in their design. As set forth below in Subpart
B, workplace discrimination derives from the complex organizational
structures and institutional practices characteristic of the modem
workplace. 25 Hence, there exist numerous avenues for bias to infect the
decision-making process well after an individual is hired.
(declining to apply the inference where the "institution may be the same, but the actors operating it are
not"); see also Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1253 (8th Cir. 1997) (declining to infer non
discrimination when derogatory comments made by plaintiffs supervisor could have influenced
employer's decision to fire plaintiff); E.E.O.C. v. First Midwest Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1028
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (declining to apply the doctrine where he person who hired the employee was not the
sole decision maker); Towns v. Chi-Chi's, Inc., No. 5:96-CV-203, 1997 WL 816294 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
30 1997) (deeming same actor inference not dispositive "because Nagele was not the sole decision
maker").
123 As Krieger has noted, there is a "disjunction" in perspectives on intergroup bias between those
in the social science realm, those for whom it is a lived experience, and the narrative that pervades Title
VII doctrine. White & Krieger, supra note 78, at 508.
124 While the courts have formulated and expanded the same-actor principle without attention to
complex workplace dynamics, they have not totally ignored such developments in workplace
jurisprudence altogether. In fact, in the development of another doctrine, the courts have
acknowledged the complexities of the modem workplace and their effect on judgment and evaluation
of workers under a theory known as the cat's paw doctrine. As discussed more fully in Part Il1,
through this doctrine courts hone in on the influential nature of the relationships between the decision-
makers involving groups, subordinate employees, and managers.
125 See Green, supra note 10, at 92-111; see also Green, supra note 78, at 625.
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B. How the Vectors of Contemporary Work Life Can Create or Activate
Conditions for Bias to Flourish
1. The Team Effect
In considering work teams and other such structural devices, it is
important to further contextualize this concept to better illuminate the
effect of work groups and related configurations on the engagement and
perceptions amongst team members, and workplace decision-making
processes in particular. Research on teams and theories of group
interaction reflect that the orchestration of work through team networks
can affect the manner in which teams communicate and make quality
decisions.1 26  The highly integrated and productive workteam can face
tremendous challenges. 127
a. Team Life Cycle and Internal Conflict
Initial team or group formation can produce a euphoric atmosphere
charged with excitement, hope, and anticipation for the collaborative
journey. However, once the novelty wears off, and a team settles in to find
its identity, the intersection of individuality and collectivity creates tension.
This is when the dysfunction of team operation can emerge. At this
juncture, since team objectives can become commingled with self-
interested goals, a decision-maker can easily alter her view of a worker's
value and performance. 1
28
It can take a group of employees up to five years to reach self-directed
maturity. 129 This gestational period can create fierce competition within a
team and even lead to its deterioration. 130 The seeds of bias can begin to
germinate as the perils of group transformation set in.' 3' Thus, those
aspects that reap strong team efforts become liabilities to the relative
stability of the network as it matures. For example, as work teams evolve
and become entrenched in the workplace, the deep involvement and
intense loyalty of workers "can mask internal unrest and outright
dysfunction."'' 32  Simultaneous growth of intense loyalty can produce a
kind of zealotry that can incite unhealthy rivalry manifesting in distrust and
backstabbing, such as the withholding of critical information and
126 See generally ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81; Alge et al., supra note 93; see also generally
Caesar Douglas et al., Communication in the Transition to Self-directed Work Teams, 43 J. BUS.
CoMm. 295 (2006) (discussing the relationship of team communication and team effectiveness).
127 See generally Jehn, supra note 91.
128 Pollard, supra note 86, at 935 (commenting that evaluative systems like self-directed work
team "encourage team members to align their personal goals with that of the team").
129 See ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81, at 18.
130 Id.
131 Research shows fairly predictable stages of transition for workers into self-directed work
teams with inevitable perils. Id. at 19-23.
132 Id. at 22.
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resources.'33  Often work teams comprise salaried and hourly workers.
134
Blurred lines with regard to various classes of employees and job
responsibilities can become fertile ground for interpersonal strife and
contentious subjectivity. Such factions can produce bias in the decision-
making processes.
Certainly, in the midst of a team's growing pains, a worker could be
deemed an outsider to such a degree that the tide and support turn against
her. Thus, a valued member of a team could become an ostracized
outsider. After a worker is hired, for example, she may matriculate to a
group during a particularly vulnerable time in the team's life cycle. Once
the honeymoon stage ends, confusion sets in as team members seek to
negotiate their new roles and absorb the reality of collective
responsibility. 3 5 Even after a work group establishes and appears cohesive
in operation and spirit, the introduction of a new member, for example, has
provoked unrest. 3 6 In such instances, the team has experienced difficulty
in accepting the new member.13 1 One can imagine how this might result in
negative feedback towards, or unsuccessful integration of, the new
member.'38  Once an employee is unable to successfully integrate, the
perception of that individual can change so much that it influences the
decision-making process.
1 39
In an essay on work teams, Professor Karen Jehn explores the various
types of conflict that arise from group work and links the various conflicts
to team diversity. 140  She addresses several types of clashes that often
emanate from team efforts-relationship conflicts, task conflicts and
process conflicts.' 41  Relationship conflicts arise from differences in
personalities, also known as "interpersonal antagonism." While unrelated
to work products, these conflicts can amplify the incompatibility of
members and disrupt the communal spirit relating to interpersonal tension,
friendliness, and commitment. 142  Research reflects that diversity
negatively influences group conflict. 43  Moreover, the dysfunction of a
team can result from "task conflicts," as well as "process conflicts," that
1 Id.
134 Id. at 21.
13 Id. at 19-23.
136 1d. at22.
137 Id; see also Bettenhausen & Mumighan, supra note 93, at 369 (discussing the integration of a
new member into a group setting with respect to acceptance of group norms).
131 Interestingly, research has shown that a newcomer attempting to manage the group's
impression of her may be reluctant to seek feedback or vital information necessary to fully integrate
into or contribute to an organization. See, e.g., Svetlana Madzar, Feedback Seeking Behavior: A
Review of the Literature and Implications for HRD Practitioners, 6 HUM. RESOURCES DEV. Q. 337,
339-41 (1995) (reviewing literature reflecting that "[s]ocial expetations and communication norms can,
in some organizational environments, also make individuals reluctant to seek feedback").
139 See Barker, supra note 106, at 425-27.
140 Jehn, supra note 91, at 476-77.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 477-78.
143 Id. at 477.
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drive how work goals are accomplished.' 44 This work indicates that social
category information can negatively affect team processing and decision-
making, all due to the demographics of work groups.
145
b. Team Typology, Group Processing and Interpersonal Dynamics
The typology and tasks of a particular team constitute additional facets
of teamwork that can potentially upset equilibrium of team processing and
collaboration. Employers use different types of team configurations, the
scope of which may depend on organizational goals, available skills sets,
and mechanisms for engagement, to name a few. For example, a business
may create ad hoc teams or project-specific teams to accomplish more
short-term goals. To more fully integrate a service, product, or other
offering into the company's overall strategy, it may create divisions or
other work units comprised of teams to focus on more long-range plans.
Irrespective of the type of team, its members may constitute individuals
who have worked together in the past or bring together workers who have
no more than a casual knowledge, if any, of each other's existence in the
organization. Nevertheless, strategic composition of teams can affect team
interaction, information exchange, and levels of openness and trust.146
For example, unencumbered by history and shared knowledge, a team
without an appreciable future or that anticipates only brief engagement (i.e.
ad hoc teams, project-specific teams) may engage effectively to
accomplish the work task, such as designing a product or problem
solving.147  But the lack of fidelity and incentive to endure that may
accompany transitory work relationships makes it easier for an evaluator to
change his mind about a worker. As one study shows, team members
without an expectation for future contact lack accountability to one
another. 148  In these situations, there is less incentive for openness and
sharing of vital information, characteristics that typically make teams more
effective. Such indifference may result in the projection of various
144id
141 See id at 484-86 (reflecting that the more surface-level diversity in a team, the more conflict
the group experiences). Jehn conducted a field study that bears out the complexity of diverse team
engagement and processing dependent on the type of diversity (informational, social categorical, value-
laden) and types of conflicts (task, relationship and process). She offers some assessment on how
groups can mediate the tension that arises from diversity in composition.
146 Compare Alge et al., supra note 93, at 27 (reporting a study that illustrates that "[t]he causal
relationship between communication effectiveness and decision-making effectiveness... is moderated
by task interdependence"), with Susan Mohammed & Linda C. Angell, Surface- and Deep-level
Diversity in Workgroups: Examining the Moderating Effects of Team Orientation and Team Process on
Relationship Conflict, 25 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1015, 1015-17, 1033-34 (2004) (analyzing a
longitudinal study reflecting that team orientation and team process moderates the conflict caused by
surface-level diversity, specifically, gender, and ethnicity).
147 See, e.g., Bettenhausen & Murnighan, supra note 93, at 369 (discussing the benefit of a lack of
shared history to on the ability of ad hoc committees and special work teams to resolve differences).
148 Alge et al., supra note 93, at 32.
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stereotypes and judgments about an individual's job performance. 149
Due to a shared history of experienced teams with a past, however,
there arguably exists a greater capacity for more effective communication
and productivity. Team members' skills, abilities, personalities and
behavioral tendencies are common knowledge. This shared history can
serve to increase coordination amongst members and result in more
accurate decision-making and problem solving by the team. 50 Yet,
research on social processing in groups reveals, while inherently intimate
with respect to particular team dynamics and idiosyncrasies, teams with
past experience had lower degrees of effective exchange and openness as
compared to groups without any historical reference but that anticipated a
future together.' 5 ' While a lack of shared experience can serve as an
impediment to effective collaboration in a group setting, such intimacy is
not a shield from dysfunction. Familiarity breeds a certain complacency
that irritates the cohesiveness of the unit and disturbs the unit's problem
solving capacity. Significantly, as team processing theory reveals, the
existence of a past association alone does not guarantee positive
relations.' 52 Thus, negative experiences with a team member, even after
positive experiences such as increased job responsibility or promotion after
a worker is hired, can affect interpersonal relations amongst team
members. Additionally, if a team is unwilling to openly share information,
an individual worker without the critical details to accomplish her assigned
task is unable to effectively contribute to the group effort. In the eyes of
the team, this member adds less value and may be cast as a hindrance to
the group, particularly where there is a high level of task
interdependence. 53 Studies have shown that white women and minorities
suffer most from such interpersonal dynamics. 54 Moreover, technological
149 See Sturm, supra note 10, at 663-69 (analyzing work teams and group decision-making
processes reflecting the manner in which dysfunction can set in when teams are unable to effectively
resolve conflict that may result from "[u]narticulated racial and gender dynamics" and well as team
typology). What seems clear is that team processing convolutes the identity of the true decision-maker,
and therefore confounds the search for unlawful motive.
150 Alge et al., supra note 93, at 33. One might argue that experience affords teams an advantage,
even in the typical life cycle. That is, a team with a past, and perhaps once marked by fairly positive
experiences, can work out dissention. But this perspective fails to account for other variables at play
within team dynamics, such as demographic differences, power imbalances, and stereotypes.
'
51 d. at 28, 32.
132 As the authors of this study concluded, "teams with a history of positive experiences might
perform very differently than teams with negative a history." Id. at 34.
153 See generally Cristina B. Gibson, Do They Do What They Believe They Can? Group Efficacy
and Group Effectiveness Across Tasks and Cultures, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 138 (1999) (demonstrating
how high group efficacy is not always beneficial); Ruth Wageman, Interdependence and Group
Effectiveness, 40 ADMIN. SC. Q. 145 (1995) (analyzing different workplace group models).
'54 Social demography literature indicates that outsiders in an organizational setting experience
exclusion for information networks, and by extension, upward mobility in their careers. See Michl E.
Mor Barak & Amy Levin, Outside of the Corporate Mainstream and Excluded from the Work
Community: A Study of Diversity, Job Satisfaction and Well-being, 5 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAM. 133,
136 (2002) (referencing the work of Cox and lbarra). The use of work teams does not diminish the use
and operation of stereotypes of those individuals from groups considered outsiders. See, e.g., Curtis
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advances have profoundly impacted (or transformed) the way in which
work goals are coordinated, communicated, and accomplished in our work
environments.'55 Paradoxically, the heightened state of connectivity that
pervades all aspects of our work, whether in form or substance, may not
have the production-inducement effect employers intend, and in fact may
constitute a vector that exacerbates the spread of bias. 1
56
The body of team processing literature continues to evolve. Without a
doubt, this body of work illuminates the intense social strata and contextual
forces inherent in team settings. This work demonstrates the complexity
and fragility of workplace engagement, and the manner in which biased
subjectivity can infiltrate the evaluative and decision-making practices in
work settings well after an individual is hired. 5 7  The notion that a
Simmons et al., Does Your Company Discriminate?, BLACK ENTERPRISE MAG., July 2003, at 80
(reporting that a company utilized segregated work teams and that a team comprised solely of African-
American employees was reportedly referred to as the "Soul Train Team"). This kind of perception
can breed discriminatory attitudes and decision-making within the workplace. Moreover, as
management theorists have shown empirically, the quality and effectiveness of decision-making may
be quite sensitive to media type and task interdependence. For example, remote supervision of workers
may result in the evaluator's resolution of various personnel-related issues without adequate
information, and thus resort to stereotypes or biased perceptions. Moreover, without the
communication cues more easily discemable in face-to-face contact, the virtual manager unilaterally
makes employment decisions. Problem solving in the team setting adds to this complexity. Once
conflict arises in the group setting, negotiation and resolution will require exchange of "maximally rich
information, including not only facts, but also values, attitudes, affective messages, expectations,
commitments, and so on." Alge et al., supra note 93, at 29.
' See generally Terri L. Griffith et al., Virtualness and Knowledge in Teams: Managing the Love
Triangle of Organizations, Individuals, and Information Technology, 27 MIS Q. 265 (2003) (discussing
the effect of technology on the transfer of knowledge in organizational settings); Raymond F.
Zammuto, Information Technology and the Changing Fabric of Organization, 18 ORG. Sci. 749 (2007)
(exploring the technological revolution on organizational practices such as employee collaboration).
156 Business theorists, as well as social science scholars, realize the need for increased study on
virtual teams, and have begun to engage in comparative study with face-to-face involvement. Some
recent organizational behavioral studies on team processing reveal interesting dichotomies that can
affect group interaction and judgment. While the research in these areas continues to evolve, recent
advancements increasingly seek to contextualize team processes in order to further understand the
nexus between productive team engagement and numerous variables such as temporal scope and
communication media. The gravity of these connections is demonstrated by one such study in which
business scholars theorized the effect of temporal scope on team engagement. Building on various
team processing theories, these scholars test the effect of various characteristics of temporal scope on
face-to-face and virtual teams, as well as communication and decision-making effectiveness. See Alge
et al., supra note 93, at 26 ("The purpose of this study is to look at one critical contextual factor that is
likely to impact team processes: temporal scope, or the extent to which teams 'have pasts together and
expect to have futures."') (citing Joseph E. McGrath, Time, Interaction, and Performance (TIP): A
Theory of Groups, 22 SMALL GROUP REs. 147, 149 (1991)). See also Griffith et al., supra note 155, at
279-82 (exploring how technology can operate as a debstabilizing force between employers and
employees).
157 Tracing the evolution of various workplace structural changes in the United States, scholar
Tristin Green has thoroughly documented the organizational trends including the use of work teams.
Green, supra note 10, at 99-108. In her exploration, Green has asserted, rather convincingly, that
workplace discrimination derives from the complex organizational structures and institutional practices
characteristic of the modem workplace. With respect to work teams in particular, Green asserts that
implementation of work teams (whether self-directed or led by a coach), flattened organizational
structures, and collective evaluative processes "may facilitate the subtle, often unconscious, operation
of discriminatory bias." Id. at 102-04; see also Green, supra note 78, at 625-27 (identifying work
culture as a basis of workplace discrimination and suggesting legal incentives to change organizational
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decision-maker who hires an individual has no capacity to discriminate
thereafter is quite unsettling, particularly in light of the turbulent
maturation and collaborative problem-solving processes of group work.
As the literature on self-directed work teams and group processing reveals,
the underlying assumption of the same-actor doctrine, premised on a single
evaluator making a decision within a short time period, is simply wrong. It
neither aligns nor reflects the complexities that pervade many
workplaces. 58
2. Relational Forces and Decision-making
The relationship between people in organizations and the environments
in which they function further informs what can motivate decision-makers.
This ecological knowledge is critical to understanding how bias generates
and operates. The interplay of relational demography and organizational
culture, for example, provides additional explanation for dysfunction in
work groups, and serves as a catalyst for the complex psychological
dynamics that manifest in work settings. These group theories on social
processing and interpersonal dynamics, combined with research on
corporate culture, demonstrate the relational influence on decision-
making. 159  This vector and its situational factors produce various
manifestations of discrimination that Proud and its progeny have ignored.
a. Group Composition and In-Group Favortism
Social science teaches that groups develop identities and personalities,
orientations that may be heavily influenced by the culture of an
organization. Additionally, in-group favoritism can occur both within and
structures in order to influence work cultures). I agree with Green and believe this work supports my
view with respect to the same-actor inference in particular. Structural complexities of the modem
workplace manifest into even more complex interpersonal dynamics, such that the courts' reliance on
the same-actor principle is strikingly illogical and quite problematic.
158 1 will concede that not all work environments follow this new group-based model or utilize
such collaborative processes. The history of work teams in the American workplace is well
documented. See generally ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 81; SIMS, JR. & LORENZ, supra note 2. For
sure, affinity for and implementation of these and other organizational designs is simply undeniable in
the modem workplace. See, e.g., Angela Clinton, Flexible Labor: Restructuring the American Work
Force, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Aug. 1997, at 3, 3.
159 For example, Congruence Theory focuses on cooperation within organizations based on
organizational behavioral and psychological dimensions. This theory connects with social
categorization processes elicited by demographic similarity in groups and organizational cultures. See,
e.g., Jennifer A. Chatman & Sigal G. Barsade, Personality, Organizational Culture, and Cooperation:
Evidence from a Business Simulation, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 423, 423-27 (1995); Jennifer A. Chatman &
Sandra E. Spataro, Using Self-Categorizational Theory to Understand Relational Demography-based
Variations in People's Responsiveness to Organizational Culture, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 321, 321-22
(2005). Similarly, the contact hypothesis focuses on the attendant situational factors that influence
engagement. See generally Francis J. Flynn et al., Getting to Know You: The Influence of Personality
on Impressions and Performance of Demographically Different People in Organizations, 46 ADMIN.
So. Q. 414 (2001). Additionally, behavioral decision theory, distinct from social cognition theory,
illuminates the relational conflict groups. See generally Langevoort, supra note 10. All of these bodies
of literature further contextualize the contemporary workplace in an important fashion.
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between teams. The familial nature of group processing produces
informality in engagement that can inhibit the integration and acceptance
of people of color and women. 60  There is empirical support for the
proposition that racial composition significantly affects team performance
and attitudinal perceptions.' 6' Even in teams that meet organizational
goals, racial differences permeate individually held attitudes with regard to
team cohesion, valance, and achievement.' 62 Self-directed work teams and
the collective processing thereof can exacerbate these attendant aspects for
those not considered part of the "in" group in any work setting. 63  For
instance, fearing a lawsuit, management may hesitate to provide minority
employees with honest feedback regarding work performance. Without
such input, the employee who fails to improve her deficiencies and
becomes a more likely candidate for demotion, reassignment, or
discharge.' 64 Thus, a well-qualified and capable minority employee can be
fired, for example, due to the deliberate actions of a manager, team leader
or other decision-maker who hired them at the outset and participated in
earlier positive decisions with respect to that individual. 16  The worker
hired to meet a diversity goal, for example, remains an outsider from the
perspective of the reviewer. Once the saliency of that individual's identity
becomes pronounced in a work setting, we know from the well-established
work in cognitive social psychology, unconscious bias by the reviewer can
be triggered.
66
'60 This is not limited to the most common outsiders in workplace settings. For example, the
dynamic even applies to persons with disabilities and those of various religious backgrounds.
161 See Anthony M. Townsend & K. Dow Scott, Team Racial Composition, Member Attitudes,
and Performance: A Field Study, 40 INDUS. REL. 317 (2001) (analyzing a field study of 1200 workers
on self-directed work teams demonstrating that "racial composition affects team performance and racial
differences in team and performance-related attitudes").
162 Id. at 332. See also Taylor Cox et al., Effects of Ethnic Group Cultural Differences on
Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group Task, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 827, 839 (1991) (noting
that "ethnic group differences affect at least some aspects of behavior in task groups"); Richard A.
Guzzo & Marcus W. Dickson, Teams in Organizations: Recent Research on Performance and
Effectiveness, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 307, 307-08 (1996) (commenting on the relationship between
team composition and demographics on performance outcomes). See also generally W. Gary Wagner
et al., 29 ADMIN. SC. Q. 74 (1984).
163 See Green, supra note 78, at 640-43 (discussing the manifestations of a relationally dependent
work environment including the informality of promotion decisions and other aspects of one's work
life).
64 Diversity scholars have addressed this fear by whites in corporate America to engage blacks in
constructive feedback on work performance. See generally ANCELLA B. LIVERS & KEITH A. CAVER,
LEADING IN BLACK AND WHITE: WORKING ACROSS THE RACIAL DIVIDE IN CORPORATE AMERICA
(2003) (addressing, in part, how the hesitancy by corporate America to fully and fairly engage with
black workers affects overall diversity); Keith A. Caver & Ancella B. Livers, "Dear White Boss... ",
80 HARv. Bus. REV. 76 (2002) (explaining, in the form of a letter, the many issues that black
employees wish their managers would understand in order to promote true equality in the workplace).
16' This lack of feedback and mentorship may serve as a barrier to the advancement of minorities
within the workplace.
166 A self-directed work team comprised of collectivist raters may engage in favoritism of in-
group members because they are unwilling to "distinguish between the good and bad performance of
in-group members." Carolina G6mez et al., The Impact of Collectivism and In-Group/Out-Group
Membership on the Evlauation Generosity of Team Members, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1097, 1103 (2000).
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Further, studies reflect that peer evaluation in a team setting is affected
by whether the team members hold a collectivist or individualistic
orientation. This cultural stance influences the qualities and types of
contributions valued by those who review a worker's job performance.
According to recent literature exploring evaluation generosity of
collectivist reviewers, where an individual was perceived to be an "in-
group" member, collectivists gave more generous assessments to that
worker. 167  Generally, collectivists, who value shared identity and
interdependence, "discriminate against out-group members and tend to
favor in-group members.' 68  One could argue that an employer could
inoculate a team from these dynamics by altering the composition of the
team or, as a few scholars propose, employing a recategorization
strategy 69-emphasizing shared characteristics rather than physical
attributes and backgrounds which tend to differentiate workers. However,
as is well recognized in social science generally, and social identity theory
in particular, such reframing is likely to be futile so long as demographics
and cultural salience significantly influence perceptions.1
70
Additionally, in organizational literature, much has been made of the
cognitive and psychological processing of evaluators in performance
appraisals.' 7' Studies have found that perceptions such as "similarity" and
"liking" influence performance ratings. 72  This research also reveals that
This is a negative consequence of the self-directed work team and social processing theory that goes
undetected in the court's application of the same-actor doctrine. The paradox here is that overall team
effectiveness is compromised by under-performing in-group members who receive generous reviews,
and little to no feedback for improving their performance. It is important to note that unconscious bias
operates in these vectors as described in this section. Building on the groundbreaking insight of
Charles Lawrence, much of Professor Krieger's seminal work focuses on highlighting the operation of
unconscious bias in workplace decision-making. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 9, at 1161 (suggesting
"that a large number of biased employment decisions result from . . . a variety of unintentional
categorization related judgment errors"). Krieger masterfully engages the social cognition literature to
demonstrate that stereotypes operate beyond the surface and affect human processing particularly with
respect to judging others. Id. at 1189-99. Because of the existence of unconscious bias and the
difficulty of uncovering such motivation under the prevailing interpretation of Title VII law, Krieger
prescribes an inquiry focusing on the nexus between a worker's difference and the work-related
decision. Id. at 1242-43.
167 G6mez et al., supra note 166, at 1098.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 1103.
170 See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Bames, By Any Other Name?: On Being
"Regarded As" Black and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005
Wis. L. REV. 1283, 1324-25 (asserting the ineffectiveness of Title VII to eradicate racial discrimination
in a labor market saturated with the use of race-based proxies invoking negative imaging).
171 See generally Caren B. Goldberg, Relational Demography and Similarity-Attraction in
Interview Assessments and Subsequent Offer Decisions: Are we Missing Something?, 30 GROUP &
ORG. MGMT. 597 (2005) (tracking similarity attraction in the interview process and observing
significant race similarity effects for white recruiters on overall interview assessment and offer
decisions).
172 Id; see also Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility:
Empathy andRace Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1473 (2002) (asserting that "[w]hite men are
hired more easily, promoted more frequently, and paid more than people of color and women because
they are most similar to the white men who make these corporate decisions").
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friendship affects inclusion within organizations. 173  Cognitive
psychological literature also suggests that workplace decision-makers may
gain awareness of the lack of cultural fit only after some time has
passed.174 This means that even if an individual is hired, it is just as likely
that with greater exposure, the decision-maker's view of the worker
changes. Much of this relational demography literature is rooted in social
identity theory focusing on categorization of individuals based on social
constructs. This phenomenon results in decision-makers attaching value to
different categories, with "similarity" serving as a referent for positive
impressions.
175
b. Power Dynamics, Corporate Culture, and Evaluator
Self-Interest
Like any social schema, organizations and groups are not utopian
enterprises in which everyone consistently shares the same vision, values,
or execution of ideas. As explored in the previous subpart, imbalances in a
work unit's culture can result in "warring factions.' ' 176 Such divisiveness,
coupled with group members' desires to conform to an organization's
culture, can result in an employee's discharge for seemingly neutral, yet
biased reasons, even if that employee was ostensibly hired under legitimate
pretenses. For example, in order to avoid his own excommunication from
a group, a decision-maker could be influenced by a biased superior, peer,
or subordinate, then engage in an employment decision, couched in neutral
terms, but nonetheless discriminatory. Additionally, sub cultures can
develop within larger organizational cultures producing additional
tension. 177 Such factions can result in the ultimate decision-maker serving
as the cat's paw, for the biased member in a collective or within an
organization.
178
The organizational behavior and management literature emphasize the
effect of the socio-psychological forces present in group formation which
are inextricably linked to one's quest for identity, communion, and
meaning-the dynamics from which culture arises. 179  Submerged in a
strong corporate culture with high levels of agreement with regard to
173 Goldberg, supra note 171; see also Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison, Newcomers' Relationships: The
Role of Social Network Ties During Socialization, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149, 1151-52, 1157-58 (2002)
(discussing friendship ties and newcomer assimilation in work environments).
174 See generally Joel Lefkowitz, The Role of Interpersonal Affective Regard in Supervisory
Performance Ratings: A Literature Review and Proposed Causal Model, 73 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG.
PSYCHOL. 67 (2000) (confirming that "liking" may impact performance appraisals by supervisors and
suggesting that "relationship tenure" may serve as a helpful variable to buttress studies).
175 Id.
176 Chatman & Cha, supra note 87, at 23.
177 See SCHEIN, supra note 99, at 20 (acknowledging the existence of cultures within a culture and
the growth of tension therein).
"' See infra Part IV.A. 1 (generally discussing the cat's paw doctrine).
179 See generally SCHEIN, supra note 99 (discussing how culture emerges in groups).
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values, decision-makers strongly desire to assimilate. 180 This phenomenon
of belonging results in the "cognitive tendency" to judge others harshly,
and perhaps unfairly.'81 Moreover, the deeply held assumptions inherent in
an organization's culture become "embedded in the incentive, reward, and
control systems of an enterprise.' 82  This entrenchment affects decision-
makers on an individual level, not just collectively. In an effort to preserve
their reputation, credibility, and professional growth within an
organization, a decision-maker may change his mind about a worker or
justify a biased decision in a non-discriminatory manner. In fact, those
with the power to decide a worker's fate may do so for many reasons,
including public accountability, fear of invalidity, mandates, and even their
own performance identity struggles. 183  As the relational demography
literature demonstrates, organizational culture does more than inspire a
workforce; it directs how employees perceive, think, and feel about work-
related matters, including their co-workers.
184
The discourse on workplace culture suggests that such "impression
management" falls most harshly on those deemed outsiders within an
organization or group, due to the well documented predisposition to
categorize and stereotype along demographic lines, in-group favoritism,
similarity attraction, and other such theories.185 Professor Susan Fiske has
documented power dynamics in work settings and offered an explanation
of how within strong organizational cultures, depending on the saliency of
particular values, stereotypes operate as "implicit anchor[s]" for the body
as a whole. 86 Individuals that harbor no activated discriminatory animus
per se will likely (or potentially) know the "content[]" of a particular
stereotype. 87  Thus, such powerful information becomes the working
definition housed in the minds of decision-makers as dormant bias-triggers
with respect to those with whom she associates in the workplace. In her
article entitled Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on
Stereotyping, Fiske found that since the most powerful in an organization
1S0 See generally Gary G. Hamilton & Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Why People Obey: Theoretical
Observations on Power and Obedience in Complex Organizations, 28 SOC. PERSP., 3 (1985)
(theorizing on the sociological studies regarding power in organizations using an organizational lens
and highlighting how power and obedience are inextricably linked in organizations); Monica J. Harris
et al., Awareness of Power as a Moderator of Expectancy Confirmation: Who's the Boss Around
Here?, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 220 (1998) (exploring the relationship between
expectancy confirmation to show that people in organizations tend to defer to those in positions of
power).
181 Chatman et al., supra note 102.
182 See SCHEIN, supra note 99, at 174 (discussing various theories about human nature).
'83 Thus, organizational cultures in which employees are motivated by fear, for example, transmit
feedback that a particular hiring or promotion decision was risky.
184 Culture, in the organizational sense, serves as the platform upon which organizational design
and control systems thrive.
185 For a discussion of such phenomena, see, e.g., Green, supra note 78, at 647-50.
116 See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People. The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 621,623-24, 627 (1993).
187 Id. at 623.
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are likely the most overburdened, those elevated in hierarchical terms are
most likely to stereotype when they are "distracted," that is, "when their
cognitive capacity is limited."'88  The consequences of attention deficit
stereotyping is likely to fall more harshly upon the powerless in
organizations, particularly women, people of color, those challenged with
physical or mental disabilities, or other outsiders. 8 9 The complex
entanglement of power and stereotyping, particularly in environments
imbued with cultural cues, potentially affects engagement and decision-
making within organizations in profound ways.
c. Subjective selection and performance identity
This social construction of identity bears on selection of individuals
when organizations make decisions based on cultural fit. By aligning
employees with environmental factors, employers focus less on the
candidate's skill set, and more on the intangibles that make uncovering
discriminatory motive more difficult. For example, suppose an employer
seeks to promote a few workers from within the organization, and the
charge is to promote those who "relish change," "possess passion for
exceptional quality," "confront risks," or "think creatively."' 90 While
descriptive enough on some level, such "qualifications" hold such an
amorphous quality because they are generalized and undefined with
respect to any particular job task or role. The promotion decision can
quickly disintegrate to selection because "I just like that candidate," or "he
just feels right"-ultimate decisions that appeal to one's senses.' 91 Ad hoc
f Id. at 624.
189 Such attitudes can permeate all levels of organizational life from the top down. A 1994
lawsuit filed against Texaco provides a stark example of the dangerous mix of power and stereotypes
infiltrating a corporate culture. Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape, Discussed Impeding a
Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. In this
action, some employees alleged they were called "orangutans," "porch monkeys," "uppidity," and
"systemically passed over for promotions" in a racially toxic culture fostered by the organization. Id.
Plaintiffs' claims were apparently aided significantly by tape recordings of senior Texaco executives
referring to black employees as "black jellybeans," "niggers," and bemoaning the integration of
minorities into the environment including having to consider such cultural identity issues like
"Kwanzaa." Id. One executive was recorded as stating "I'm still having trouble with Hanukkah ....
Now we have Kwanzaa." Id.
'90 See Chatman & Cha, supra note 87, at 26 (noting job descriptions used in a Fortune 100
company reflecting, with intensity, the desire for candidates that match a corporate culture full of
challenge and change).
191 This type of subjective evaluation and decision-making is commonplace as employers attempt
to distinguish candidates, especially those that seem to possess substantially similar paper credentials.
For example, in Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., the Seventh Circuit went through painstaking analysis to
disavow any claim that subjective employment decisions are contrary to Title VII. In fact, according to
the court, "[a]bsent evidence that subjective hiring criteria were used as a mask for discrimination, the
fact that an employer based a hiring or promotion decision on purely subjective criteria will rarely, if
ever, prove pretext under Title VII." Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1185 (11 th Cir. 2001)). See also Baron, supra note
112, at 281 (highlighting the problematic nature of subjective hiring systems which allow the decision-
maker to wield "considerably more personal discretion," making the decisions "more susceptible" to
unconscious bias).
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decision-making based on how one feels is what occurs particularly when
an organization seeks candidate-to-culture alignment. 192  At first blush,
promoting the individual who most closely aligns with the values seems to
make good business sense, and reflects quite a natural human instinct. The
problem with a preoccupation with cultural fit in the selection process lies
in the imperceptibility of such characteristics, and the conscious and
unconscious layering of meaning on such abstract terms by the decision-
maker. In fact, in The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, Professor Lawrence observed that where an
''employer perceives the white candidate as 'more articulate,' 'more
collegial,' 'more thoughtful,' or 'more charismatic[,]' [h]e is unaware of
the learned stereotype that influenced his decision."' '3  Thus, the rub
comes when "cultural fit" is based on a highly contingent perception of
who belongs.' 94  By developing "culturally consistent selection criteria"
beyond the hiring phase, employers ensure that their halls, cubicles, and
conference rooms remain filled with those who will toe the corporate
line.' 95  For example, in the fast-paced contemporary workplace, an
employer must make decisions with incomplete and multi-dimensional
information about each candidate. A decision-maker may hire an
individual who seems to be a good fit based on paper credentials and
limited staged interview interaction. Later that same employee might be
deemed unfit in cultural terms and not selected for a promotion or other
opportunity because he failed to attune to the organization's culture.
196
People of color and other workplace minorities are often encouraged to
assimilate, mask their true identity or ethnic salience, for example, to adapt
to an organization's culture. 197  Professors Devon Carbado's and Mitu
'92 The employer is able to create a paper trail early on that reflects this cultural stance, while
simultaneously injecting the decision-making process with subjectivity.
193 Lawrence, supra note 9, at 343.
"' It becomes easy for a decision-maker to assess a candidate based on externalities such as
appearance, dress, hair style, visible disability, perceived race or gender, information relating to
religious background, or linguistic characteristics including accent, speech cadence or enunciation. A
decision-maker imports the messaging of his own identity and cultural-fit alignment and deems
candidates who are different in some way unqualified for the job, promotion or assignment. Such
selection pervades the American workplace. A recent example of such cultural-fit decision making
involves a 2003 class action lawsuit against the retailier Abercrombie and Fitch wherein plaintiffs
alleged that the companies brand of "culture & lifestyle" operated to exclude employees of color from
certain positions. Press Release, The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
EEOC Agrees to Landmark Resolution of Discrimination Case Against Abercrombie & Fitch (Nov. 16,
2004), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/l 1-18-04.html.
195 See Chatman & Cha, supra note 87, at 27 (illustrating how various companies, including Cisco
Systems, are able to develop selection criteria commensurate with goals).
1 9 For example, a decision-maker may decide that the older, female, Muslim or black worker no
longer benefits an organization. Desiring to conform to the cultural dance and consumed with the
undulations of the dynamic relational forces, the decision-maker's commitment to the organization and
desire to remain integral to it may overshadow any consideration of fairness or value of diversity within
the workforce.
197 See, e.g., Emily Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 905, 910 (2006) ("[M]embers
of outsider groups in the workplace often feel compelled to perform and signal loudly against negative
identity-related stereotypes in order to prevent discrimination based on those stereotypes.")
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Gulati's working identity theory highlights this phenomenon. As long as
the worker's difference is innocuous and unobtrusive, then the worker
benefits from efforts to belong.' 99 Conversely, once the employee fails to
sufficiently cover, he may be deemed inconsistent with the organization
and no longer befitting of inclusion.2°° Thus, how a worker performs her
identity, particularly in ethnic or racial terms, "matters almost as much as
how one looks in the post-Civil Rights era."
20
'
In sum, the social and relational phenomena shed considerable light on
the employment decision-making process. The prevalence and variability
of work structures and evaluative models alone produce complex
interpersonal relations. The social and psychological dynamics add layers
of complexity. As organizations and their climates evolve and shift, so do
the behavioral and attitudinal expectations for workers. Such movement
may be spurred by organizational changes, mergers, acquisitions, research
and development, business development, product design, service goals, and
even generational tension.20 2 The possible catalysts for shifting norms are
'9' See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1262-63 (arguing that in order to fully
understand workplace discrimination one has to examine and raise questions about both the employer's
conduct and the employee's conduct); see also Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q.
633, 655 (2005) (discussing the concept of "racial naturalization": to link racism and Americanization
through the use of models of naturalization).
199 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1270 ("A positive relationship increases workplace
standing and advancement opportunities.").
200 See id at 1269-70 ("A negative relationship between a stereotype about an employee's
identity and a certain institutional criterion diminishes [the] employee's workplace standing and
advancement opportunities in that institution."). For example, once the black employee acts too black,
the tide may turn. Such "outing" may cause a decision-maker to believe that the employee no longer
culturally fits with the organization, that the employee is not sufficiently primed or socialized. See,
e.g., Natay v. Murray Sch. Dist., No. 04-4084, 2005 WL 44965, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 2005)
(describing where a decision-maker told the plaintiff that she was "geographically, racially, culturally,
and socially out of place"). See also generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769 (2002)
(addressing how outsiders deliberately downplay or "cover" their differences to make themselves more
palatable to insiders). It is important to note that recently, in the legal realm, some have begun to take
corporate culture more seriously. Legal scholars have expanded the social science foundation and
begun to engage these interdisciplinary concepts to advocate new theories of workplace discrimination
and reconcile established anti-discrimination doctrine. Notably, Professor Tristin K. Green has traced
the evolution of concepts of culture in management discourse and its transference to the theoretical and
practical aspects of the modem American workplace. In her article Work Culture and Discrimination,
she ventures towards law reform proposing workplace culture as a potential source of discrimination
within organizations. Green, supra note 78. Green maintains that work culture is, at its core, a social
relations phenomenon. That is, a human process, as well as a structural one, subject to power dynamics
and a "myriad of cognitive and motivational biases." Id. at 628. Green's work provides a strong
foundation lending credence to my view that relying on same-actor evidence to ferret discriminatory
animus misses the mark. From the view of the finder of fact, when viewed from cultural terms, the
same-actor evidence distorts the inquiry for discriminatory motive. Culture enforces boundaries set by
the ongoing relational interaction whereby the decision-makers perceive and frame expectations in
society, creating an incubator for bias to flourish.
201 KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 21-22 (2006)
(asserting that discrimination is less dependent on how white one looks, but how white one acts);
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1908 (2007)
(exploring the social construction of race).
202 See, e.g., James A. Johnson et al., The Intergenerational Workforce, Revisited, 26 ORG. DEV. J.
31(2008).
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endless, and any organization is as fragile as the culture that defines it and
the situational forces it confronts. Therefore, a decision-maker (individual
or collective) will undoubtedly be influenced by the shifting sands within
any setting.
Moreover, the demographic influence on an employment decision may
be most reliable when one contextualizes a worker's experience in a
particular setting over time. As one study suggests, perhaps "only through
aggregating data across decisions and across decision-makers can most
conclusions about the effects of race [or other characteristics] be offered
with any degree of confidence. 20 3 Thus, relying on a shorthand reference,
like same-actor evidence, tells us nothing meaningful, and certainly
nothing determinative, about the motivation of the decision-makers
involved.
Through use of the same-actor doctrine, the courts often paint a picture
of a benevolent employer, filled with workers who enter and exit the
workplace on an even playing field. Underneath this broad view lies a
complex web of behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements that create a
unique, pervasive, and influential energy which permeates and gives life to
work groups. That salient force produces complex social and cultural
dynamics. Business tools such as work teams and collective problem
solving constitute vectors through which bias can infect the decision-
making process in any organization. The interplay of relational,
environmental, and psychological forces cannot be denied. Due to these
phenomena, discrimination is far more complex than courts are willing to
recognize.
IV. LET'S STOP "PLAYING IN THE DARK" 2 : EVALUATION OF THE SAME-
ACTOR FACTOR IN CONTEXT
Workplace discrimination emanates from a complex mosaic of social
interactions, perceptions, and dynamics-bearing on the assessment of a
worker's worth-creating the climate for bias in decision-making. The
result is a kind of discrimination that the most equitably articulated
workplace policies and good faith efforts cannot dismantle. Professor
Lawrence first recognized this phenomenon twenty years ago in his
ground-breaking work, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism.20 5 As Lawrence posited, "a motive-centered
doctrine of racial discrimination places a very heavy, and often impossible,
burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the dispute. Improper motives
are easy to hide. ' 2 6  Conscious intentionality has little to do with
203 Michael 1. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and
Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 36,52 (2006).
2
04 MORRISON, supra note 1.
205 Lawrence, supra note 9.
206 Id. at 319 (footnote omitted).
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discrimination, particularly in settings comprised of complex group
structures. Thus, judicial formulations like the same-actor doctrine that are
premised on intentional discriminatory motives further debilitate plaintiffs'
efforts in seeking redress for unlawful discrimination.
Professors Belton and Krieger, for example, observe that the "implicit
assumption in the same-actor principle is that discriminatory animus, if it
exists, manifests itself in all aspects of the employment relationship from
initial hire through termination and [with respect to] all other terms and
conditions of employment. '" 207 However, the same actor may be unaware
that his or her bias is operating when a particular employee is hired, but
such sentiment is subsequently triggered by the behavior of the employee.
I agree with these scholars that this assumption is flawed. Additionally, as
I have demonstrated, organizational behavior and management theory
further reflect the dynamic nature of workplace engagement and decision-
making, particularly where work teams and collective problem solving
practices exist. Significantly, organizations themselves are not static, even
those with strong corporate visions and values, particularly in today's
economic climate. Part II of the Article explored three facets of
organizational life that affect workplace decision-making and interpersonal
relations-work structure, evaluative models, and social-psychological
forces. Each of these aspects illuminates the contingent, relational, and
subjective nature of human interaction and bears significantly on an
employer's motivation in any the workplace context. Proud's blind
reliance on the underlying false psychological assumption of the same-
actor principle represents a desire to refrain from coercive constraint on
employers and accord deference to business judgment.20 8
A. Debunking the Myth of Proud: Association as Acceptance and Other
Flawed Assumptions
I have engaged the problematic nature of the same-actor principle and
sought to demonstrate the danger of the doctrine's underlying assumptions
as its expansion reflects, particularly Proud's requirement that the same
decision-maker engage in the positive as well as negative decisions within
a short time period. The idea that one decision-maker exists and that a
short time period between the positive and negative employment decisions
removes any possibility that bias can occur simply fails to mirror the
modern workplace.
207 ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 137 (7th ed. 2004); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights
Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1314-16 (1998)
(arguing that the same-actor defense is flawed because it is "simply not how discrimination works").
208 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1039-52 (2006)
(asserting that judicial reaction to discrimination allegations often reflects a tendency to accord
business judgment deference to employers).
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1. The Elusive Same Actor: Work Configuration and Decision-making
As explored in Part II, the American workplace has undergone
tremendous changes in the last few decades, particularly with respect to the
orchestration of work and utilization of workers. As this research shows,
discrimination is a human process made more complex by social, cultural,
structural, and operational phenomena of organizations and groups. Thus,
the courts' adoption of the same-actor inference in the modem era, without
any exploration of social science, organizational behavior, and
management systems, was wrongheaded but seemingly deliberate. 20 9 The
notion that "the same actor" exists at all is contrary to the structure so
prevalent in today's work environments where several individuals
contribute to a decision.
Ironically, the flawed assumptions behind the same-actor doctrine have
not tainted completely employment discrimination law. The courts have
not ignored contemporary workplace realities altogether under Title VII
law, including group dynamics. For example, under a theory known as the
"cat's paw" doctrine, courts have declared that a collective can serve as a
"conduit of [the supervisor's or even suborindate's] prejudice-his cat's
paw.,210  The courts applying this doctrine seem to recognize the
complexities of group decision-making, 21' namely its multifarious and
interdependent nature.
As studies of group processing reveal, a committee does not serve as a
buffer to preserve the integrity and fairness of the decision-making process
where bias may penetrate due to the proclivities of those on the work team
209 See supra Part II.A (discussing Proud v. Stone and the origins of the same-actor doctrine).
210 See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). The court
found discriminatory animus where a hiring committee's decision to discharge a worker was "tainted"
by the supervisor's bias.While the committee was unaware of the plaintiff's age at the time of its
decision, the court found that the supervisor's biased age-related comments that shed him in the "worst
possible light" to the committee served to set up the plaintiffto fail. Id. Thus, the court recognized the
consequential and possibly determinative nature of the supervisor's input. Instead of disregarding the
influence of such biased input, the court declared it significant with regard to the employer's intent to
discriminate. Id. At the most basic level, the court's embrace of a more contextualized view of
behavior in organizations concedes that discrimination can arise when one acts on the preferences or
bias of another. See White & Krieger, supra note 78, at 511-15 (discussing examples of cat's paw
doctrine operating in recent cases). See also BELTON ET AL., supra note 207, at 148.
211 The courts have even adopted the cat's paw theory in circumstances where a subordinate or
peer-level employee expresses bias that influences the ultimate decision-maker. See, e.g., Schreiner v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 250 F.3d 1096, 1100 (7th Cir. 2001) (deeming that there must be a nexus between the
biased input and the ultimate decision-maker's actions); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d
219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases adopting the cat's paw theory); Griffin v. Wash. Convention
Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that "evidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant
where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence"). The Supreme
Court has even recognized such complexities in imposing liability on employers for sexual harassment
by supervisors. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
212 EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
852 (2007) (applying cat's paw theory where the human resources official who decided to discharge
plaintiff worked in a different city and did not know plaintiff was black, but relied exclusively on
information provided by plaintiffs immediate supervisor who allegedly harbored bias evidenced by
discriminatory remarks).
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or manifest from the group dynamic itself.213 Doctrines such as cat's paw
demonstrate that courts are not totally oblivious to these phenomena
either.214  This is just the type of nuanced analysis largely missing under
the same-actor inference.
Why do the courts take such a shortsighted attitude toward such
phenomena and find it difficult to impute an invidious motivation in
presence of same-actor evidence? I believe, in part, the answer is that
same-actor evidence tends to support a theme that lies at the heart of many
aspects of employment discrimination law-the employer knows best how
to operate its business, and the law ought not to infringe on its ability to do
213 See Sturm, supra note 10, at 659-63 (pursuing the manner in which decision-making occurs
regarding a worker's status and asserting that courts' analyses "assume[] that the power to make
decisions affecting employment status correlates with the level of formal power in the organization").
See also Alge et al., supra note 93 (noting differences between teams using traditional face-to-face
meetings and those meeting through electronic media and how the results differ based on whether a
team has a history or future together).
214 While one could argue that a collective decision-making process mediates any bias harbored
by others within the group or outside of it, organizational behavior literature shows us differently. For
example, research on the contact hypothesis (that increased contact between members of different
groups positively affects the impressions they develop about one another) shows that interpersonal
contact often fails to reduce conflict between different groups. Flynn et al., supra note 159, at 414.
This research is important because it demonstrates that teamwork does not necessarily minimize the use
of stereotypes and other social psychological factors. Employers utilize all sorts of work structures and
evaluative models that bear on human motivation and engagement. While employers often use such
processes to increase productivity, improve employee morale, and secure survival of an organization,
such strategic decisions can become breeding grounds for bias. It is this amorphous, "relationally
dependent" work environment that can illuminate, and even mask, discriminatory bias. The bottom
line is that this entanglement complicates the search for motive in Title VII disparate treatment cases
generally, and with regard to the same-actor inference, particularly. A recent federal district court
opinion illuminates this concern. In Lim v. Franciscan Health Systems, with goals of improving
hospital processes and influencing patient safety, defendant maintained a Quality Improvement
Monitoring Program (QIM) through which employees report deficiencies in patient care without risk of
discipline. QIM contains an anti-retaliation component to encourage employees to report their co-
workers. Lim v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. C06-5191 FDB, 2007 WL 764726, at *I (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 9, 2007). Through this self-policing mechanism, plaintiff's co-workers complained of errors and
other problems relating to plaintiff's performance. Id. The use of the internal QIM system sparked the
investigations and a series of events that ultimately led to plaintiffs discharge. Id at **1-2.
2'5 Workplace reporting structures and decisionmaking processes are quite complex in
contemporary settings, particularly those that involve multiple work locations and varied input data
upon which a supervisor makes decisions regarding the terms and conditions of a worker's
employment. See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 144-48 (2d Cir. 2004) (Plaintiff's co-
workers, who were predominantly minorities, and were Christian and heterosexual, allegedly
discriminated against him because he was white, Jewish, and homosexual. Plaintiff worked in the
Manhattan office, while his supervisor, who was also Jewish, worked in the Brooklyn office. After
plaintiff complained of his co-workers treatment of him, his supervisor met with one of the co-workers
and agreed to terminate plaintiff. The trial court found that the only party that had a material role in
plaintiffs termination was his immediate supervisor.). There are courts that apply the same-actor
doctrine in a group decision-making context without any recognition of this difference or consideration
of just how this may encumber the search for motive. See, e.g., Mischer v. Erie Metro Hous. Auth.,
168 F. App'x 709, 710-13 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that board terminated black female plaintiff two
months after naming her Executive Director, in part because of her "confrontational" management style
that resulted in numerous complaints from staff about her curt and acrimonious treatment of them);
Ako-Doffou v. Univ. of Texas at San Antonio, 71 F. App'x 440, at *2 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that
plaintiff argued that same actor inference was inapplicable because his supervisor merely "rubber-
stamped" the recommendations of his subordinates).
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so, particularly where the employer voluntarily diversifies its workforce.216
The courts cast the employer as a "diversity do-gooder." Unsurprisingly,
rational organizations actively employ, and even exploit, the same-actor
doctrine to escape sanctions under Title VII.217 This immunity-for-hire is
problematic, precisely because, as a more microscopic view reveals,
employment discrimination is a multi-dimensional problem that emanates
from the intersection of complex systems.
2. Timing and Workplace Realities
Much can transpire during an employee's tenure, and those
circumstances can be the catalyst to an employer's change of heart
resulting in an adverse employment action. The cases that apply the
inference in circumstances involving longer time periods between the
positive and negative employment actions are far more troubling.
Discriminatory attitudes may dwell just below the surface triggered only
through increased engagement as the employment relationship evolves.
2
,
8
These dynamics are amplified in complex group settings or other structural
designs. Additionally, organizations change over time, and in today's
economic climate, more readily at a quicker pace, due to competition and
technological advances. For example, changing business conditions may
arise through mergers, acquisitions, financial crises, or high-level
administrative changes. Significantly, structural and operational changes
that occur over time spur complex relational dynamics that can affect the
terms and conditions of a worker's employment. Such circumstances may
provide the impetus for a decision-maker to take biased action and a way
for employers to couch these decisions in a non-discriminatory manner.
Interestingly, some courts have recognized such dynamics and their
effect on decision-making, expressly or by implication, in declining to
216 Krieger has explored the stray remarks doctrine and business judgment rules-concepts that
have grown out of the courts' accommodating posture towards organizations. Krieger, supra note 9, at
1184, 1228.
217 Organizations and their lawyers even encourage their supervisors, managers, and human
resource professionals to use the inference. They often direct them to determine the relevant actors and
engage the same decision-makers in firing and other workplace decisions in order to preserve the use of
this defense if litigation ensues. See, e.g., Jay P. Levy-Warren, "Same Actor" Role Must Be
Considered, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1998, at 2 (advising that "[b]oth plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants'
attorneys need to take the role of the same actor into account. For a defendant's attorney, this requires
assessing the extent to which the facts can support reliance on the role of the same actor."). An internet
search reveals that employers are well aware of the significance of same actor evidence. See, e.g., Rick
Kaiser, Retaliation Claims-The Ticket to Trial, Navigator (Lake Washington Human Resource
Association), Apr. 2006, at 5, available at http://www.lwhra.org/wasamasnhr/doc.nsf/files/566D97
3F93A8319C8725714500598577/$file/April%202006%20Navigator.pdf; Donald J. Spero, Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, HR-GUIDE.coM, http://www.hr-guide.com/data/A07301.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2008). The sociological perspective of organizational response to law indicates that
law and organizations are "dynamically interwined." Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The
Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 479 (1997). "Thus, organizations
instrumentally invoke or evade the law, in a strategic effort to 'engineer' legal activities that bring the
largest possible payoff at the least possible cost." Id. at 482.
21 See, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 208, at 1048-50.
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apply the inference.219 For example, in Jetter v. Knothe Corp., the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit opined that the same-actor principle has
"far less applicability" where the employer has a "collateral incentive" to
hire the plaintiff in the first instance.20 In Jetter, the defendant desired to
acquire plaintiffs apparel company, and to do so, plaintiff came as part of
the package along with his two brothers with whom he co-founded the
company. 22 ' Shortly after the acquisition, "significant work-related
tensions" arose between defendant and plaintiff, who received performance
counseling by a group of decision-makers, the same individuals who
ultimately terminated his employment.222 The court ultimately affirmed
the summary dismissal in favor of the employer due to plaintiff s failure to
proffer sufficient evidence of age discrimination.223 What stands out,
however, is the court's acknowledgement that the initial hiring decision
alone bears scrutiny in relation to the same-actor doctrine 224 and
recognition of the complexity of changing business conditions, particularly
where strategic business-oriented matters such as acquisitions and mergers
are at stake. 22 5 This shows that an employer may hire an individual for any
number of self-interested reasons, including collateral. incentive as
reflected in Jetter, and importantly, remain entirely capable of
discrimination.226 Thus, Jetter cautions against allowing an initial positive
decision to become a proxy for another without some consideration of
related business inertia that occurs over time and the social dynamics that
such conditions may produce.227
There are numerous other reasons why an employer might hire an
employee or grant some favor upon her, including low expectation of that
individual to begin with, diversity goals, or impression management of the
219 See, e.g., Tellepsen Pipeline Servs. Co. v. NLRB, 320 F.3d 554, 569 (5th Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging that a change in circumstances can occur between time of hiring and firing); Mitchell
v. Superior Court of Cal., County of San Mateo, Nos. C 04-3135 VRW, C 04-3301 VRW, 2007 WL
1655626, at * 14-15 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2007) (hesitating to apply the same-actor inference as requested
by employer where thirteen years elapsed between promotion and termination in a case where inference
is helpful but unnecessary for employer to obtain summary judgment); Bardales v. Western Stone and
Metal, No. 05-cv-01435-WDM-BNB, 2007 WL 1087096, at *6 n.8 (D. Colo. Apr. 10, 2007) (declining
to apply the same-actor inference where six years existed between hiring and promotion); Thomas v.
iStar Fin., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (declining to apply same-actor inference
because three years elapsed between hiring and firing). For discussion of organizational realities in the
contemporary workplace, see supra Part HI, pp. 1138-39.
220 Jetter v. Knothe Corp., 324 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2003).
221 Id. at 74, 76.
222 Id. at 74-75. While Jetter was an age discrimination case, the court applied the same burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas used in Title VII cases. Id. at 75-76.
223 Id. at 73, 76.
224 See id. at 76 (noting that "[tihe same-actor rationale has far less applicability in these
circumstances").
225 See id (noting the influence of internal reorganization, job performance, and non-compete
issues).
226 See id. (upholding the district court's finding of a prima facie case of discrimination).
227 Beyond hiring in accordance with a diversity goal, for example, courts have no real way to
assess the soundness of the employer's initial decision to hire such that it becomes a signal of non-bias.
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decision-maker's career as addressed in Part 111.228 Thus, the favorable
action ought not to inoculate an employer from allegations of bias. As the
employment relationship evolves with the passage of time, whether three
months or three years, a decision-maker remains capable of discriminatory
animus. As one court has recognized, "the enthusiasm with which the
actor hired the employee years before may have waned with the passage of
time because the relationship between an employer and an employee,
characterized by reciprocal obligations and duties, is, like them, subject to
time's 'wrackful siege of battering days."' 229 Suffice it to say, anything is
possible in the world of the contemporary workplace.
B. The Clarity of Context: An Illustration of How Courts Can Get It Right
In my view, race claims illuminate particularly well just how flawed
the doctrine's underlying assumptions are in relation to the complexity of
contemporary workplace dynamics. A striking example of these
phenomena appears in Johnson v. Zema Systems Corporation.23 °
Perceptively, the Seventh Circuit determined that the same-actor
assumption may not hold true in certain contexts, particularly those
involving organizational dynamics produced by stereotypical attitudes held
by decision-makers, stagnant corporate cultures, and realities of business
development and growth.2 3' In this matter, the defendant, a distributor for
Miller Brewing Company, had acquired and merged two distribution
companies, one that had a predominantly black workforce serving the
south side of Chicago, and the other with a predominantly white workforce
serving north Chicago.232 Despite the shared facilities, each faction until
1995 maintained its pre-merger demographic identity and worked in
separate rooms of the company's corporate offices.233
Plaintiff, a forty-one-year-old African-American male, became Vice
President of Sales and Marketing of the new entity after the merger,
overseeing the entire sales staff.234  Even post-merger, however, the
company maintained essentially a segregated workforce with disparities
with regard to various working conditions. 235 For instance, racial isolation
228 See supra Part III.B.2.
229 Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet LXV, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPERE, (W.J.Craig ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1928)).
230 Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999).
231 See id. at 745 (noting circumstances involving race and gender where the same-actor inference
may not apply).
232 Id. at 737.
23 3 Id. at 738.
234 Defendant actually hired plaintiff one month before the merger to serve as Vice President of
Sales and Marketing for the distributing arm that served south Chicago and comprised a predominantly
black workforce. Id. at 737.
233 For example, during the plaintiff's tenure, the company paid African-American sales managers
less than their white peers. The work environment also included a level of racial hostility with alleged
use of the "N" word by white workers. Id. at 738.
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extended beyond the physical office space; it also existed with respect to
servicing of the distribution accounts in that black employees were
responsible primarily for the accounts of black owners or providers.236
Within months of his tenure, plaintiff began complaining about the various
inequities that he observed-that the employer provided company cars to
white sales managers, but not the black ones, laid off black workers more
frequently and rehired them far less, and allowed a racially hostile work
environment to persist that included use of racial epithets uttered by
employees including representatives of management.2 7 The company
acknowledged several of these disparities and its efforts to address them
once plaintiff brought the issues to its attention.238 Despite favorable
performance evaluations and other indications of plaintiffs successful job
performance, defendant fired him three years after it hired him.
239
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer, the court deemed the same-actor doctrine inapplicable in light of
the evidence marshaled to show racial discrimination. 240  Despite the
company's assertion that it fired plaintiff for legitimate business reasons
upon receiving the advice of an outside consultant, the court found
plaintiff's evidence sufficient to show that the employer's reasons-cost
cutting and organizational flattening-a pretext for racial discrimination.24 l
This racially isolated work environment produced a social dynamic that
influenced the perception of the black workers as inferior and incapable.
The court suggested that those in the management ranks harbored an
expectation that the black workers would stay in their place, including the
plaintiff in his management-level position, whom company officials
expected to "comply with the race-based limitations of the job. 242 Once it
was clear that plaintiff would not help maintain the segregated workforce,
the company fired him. 243 Accordingly, the court rejected the trial court's
236 The division of accounts based on racial lines resulted in the black workers receiving lower
pay in comparison to their white peers. Id.
237 Id. Deposition testimony reflected that the company's comptroller and warehouse manager
regularly referred to African-American employees and job applicants as 'niggers."' Id. A black
secretary even overheard another employee refer to her as a "nigger." Id.
238 The employer acknowledged the existence of a racially-charged atmosphere based on the
conduct of some employees. See id. at 738-39 (noting that the defendant corrected the disparity by
providing cars to both African-American and Hispanic sales managers after plaintiff complained, and
the defendant claimed it was preparing to rectify salary discrepancies as well).
239 Plaintiff was hired in June 1991 and fired in October 1994. Id. at 737-38. The record
reflected two performance appraisals that described plaintiff's work quality in "superlatives." Id. at
737. Additionally, the President of the company prepared a letter of recommendation on plaintiff's
behalf upon termination, which described plaintiff as '"a serious and dedicated worker, whose
reliability and integrity are above question."' Id. at 737-38. Additionally, deposition testimony of a
company official admitted that plaintiff's termination was not based on poor job performance. Id. at
738.
240 Id. at 745.
24' Id. at 744.
242 Id. at 745.
243 id.
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reliance on the same-actor doctrine in granting the employer's motion for
summary judgment. 4
In its analysis of the same-actor doctrine, the court opined on the
tenuousness of the underlying psychological assumption first articulated in
Proud. Acknowledging various ways in which bias may infect the
decision-making process after the positive hiring decision, the Seventh
Circuit stated:
For example, a manager might hire a person of a certain race
expecting them not to rise to a position in the company where
daily contact with the manager would be necessary. Or an
employer might hire an employee of a certain gender
expecting that person to act, or dress, or talk in a way the
employer deems acceptable for that gender and then fire that
employee if she fails to comply with the employer's gender
stereotypes. Similarly, if an employee were the first African-
American hired, an employer might be unaware of his own
stereotypical views of African-Americans at the time of
hiring. If the employer subsequently discovers he does not
wish to work with African-Americans and fires the newly
hired employee for this reason, the employee would still have
a claim of racial discrimination despite the same-actor
inference.245
The court's observations comport with social science, organizational,
behavioral, and management literature revealing not only the existence of
unconscious bias, but also that our workplaces mirror the social and
cultural realities of our larger society.246 In my view, the Seventh Circuit's
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 One body of research bears out the Seventh Circuit's observations. For example, the work of
Dovidio and Gaertner regarding aversive racism strongly suggests that a white decision-maker
motivated by self-interest could hire a minority employee but simultaneously discriminate
unconsciously, and harbor negative feelings. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Changes in
the Expression and Assessment of Racial Prejudice, in OPENING DOORS: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE
RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 119, 131-34 (Harry Knopke et al. eds., 1991). This allows
the white decision-maker, for example, to maintain individual positive self-esteem and his "egalitarian
self-image" because he initially hired, or otherwise acted favorably toward, this worker. See
McGinley, supra note 9, at 426-28 & n.61 (discussing how unconsciously rooted biases may be even
for those self-identified white liberals due to the complex cognitive biases and environmental factors);
Krieger, supra note 207, at 1314-16 (deeming the the same-actor doctrine flawed because "[c]ognitive
forms of intergroup bias will not operate consistently, even in the same decision maker" because such
bias "var[ies], according to the specific situation in which the decision maker finds himself"). Dovidio
and Gaertner developed this theory of aversive racism that focuses on the unconscious nature of
decision-making. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra, at 131. In my view, what complicates this phenomenon
are the attendant relational forces at work in organizations, namely corporate culture, power dynamics,
and stereotyping. Thus, aversive racism and variations of unconscious bias only tell part of the story
with regard to the same-actor principle. As Professor McGinley cautions, bias constitutes a complex
alchemy and an understanding of "such phenomena as a product of one process alone is probably
misguided." McGinley, supra note 9, at 424; see also generally Krieger, supra note 9; Brant T. Lee,
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opinion represents an understanding of, or at least openness to, the
relational, cultural, and structural realities of our contemporary settings,
including stereotypes, power dynamics, and the value of difference.
Interestingly, the court surmised that the doctrine offers limited utility as a
heuristic for discriminatory animus.247 Thus, the court saw the doctrine for
what it is-a "convenient shorthand"-one, in my view, that constitutes no
basis for summary dismissal, especially in cases where racial hostility is
rampant.248
C. Playing Fair: Prescription for the Same Factor in Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases
Contextualizing the dynamism of the work environment was absent in
the formulation and expansion of the same-actor principle and remains
largely absent in the widespread continued use of the doctrine.249 My point
is that the courts should engage the shifting and complex nature of any
particular work setting instead of proclaiming the existence of same-actor
evidence determinative of, or even pertinent to, the ultimate question of
discrimination, and thereby summarily dismissing plaintiff's claims.25 °
Management and organizational behavioral literature regarding work
The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1259, 1278 (2004) ("In this regard,
note the prevalence of 'private' social discrimination that is often described as 'benign' or 'natural.'
Commentators have noted that Black and White Americans lead lives that are publicly integrated but
privately segregated; they may work at an integrated workplace, but often go home to segregated
neighborhoods, worship in segregated congregations, and enjoy different forms of cultural
entertainment.").
247 See Johnson v. Zema Syss. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that same-actor
inference "is unlikely to be dispositive in very many cases").
248 There are a few other courts that have recognized these complexities. See, e.g., Feingold v.
New York, 366 F.3d 138, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2004) (vacating in part summary dismissal of plaintiff's
Title VII claims and deeming the same-actor inference inapplicable given the "changes in
circumstances during the course of [plaintiff's] employment"-plaintiff, a white, Jewish, gay male, had
complained about discrimination, and those complaints "could be found to have altered circumstances
of his employment." That is, after plaintiff lodged the complaints, he "became not merely a white Jew
but a white Jew who.., would not tolerate a discriminatory office culture") (emphasis added); Taylor
v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 247 (4th Cir. 1999) (dissenting judge opining that "[t]he thought of
an employer hiring an individual in a protected class and, for discriminatory reasons, keeping that
person in an entry-level [position], i.e., hindering the employee from advancing to the ranks of
management or into a higher paying position, is not nearly as incredulous as the majority urges. It
does not require a stretch of the imagination to discern such a possibility ... [The fact that [an
employer] hired [the plaintiff] does not necessarily mean that he did not act with discrimination in
evaluating her or in considering her for promotion") (emphasis added).
249 Admittedly, there are some courts that have explicitly failed to apply the inference in these
contexts as reflected in this section. Id. at 240; see also Olufowobi v. Cardinal Health 200, Inc., No.
3:03CVI 161 (PCD), 2006 WL 1455625, at *12 n.14 (D.Conn. May 25, 2006) (noting that "[i]t is not
clear that the 'same-actor' inference should apply when Plaintiff was hired or fired by committee"); see
also note 248. Others, however, have applied it across groups, subgroups, and even divisions within an
organization. See, e.g., supra notes 68, 69, 215.
250 In the organizational behavior arena, no less, scholars continue to invite more
contextualization of human engagement and the decision-making processes within organizations-
specifically, the psychological mechanisms, shared cognition, processing of work teams, and the effect
of demographics. Legal analysis with respect to the same-actor inference can learn much from a
parallel reflection.
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structure and practice lend considerable insight to understanding the
operation of bias in employment settings. The nexus between the adverse
employment action and the plaintiffs protected characteristic under Title
VII will be contingent upon the variation, temporality, and scope of
various contemporary workplace tools. 251  Relying on a shorthand
reference like the same-actor inference amounts to a surface-level inquiry
at best. At its worst, the device offers an illusion of fairness and inclusion,
and serves as a barrier to equality.
One who deems himself objective, fair, and open to difference could
imagine a circumstance where the same-actor principle and its attendant
inference seem intuitive, especially if the same decision-maker acts shortly
after engaging favorably with another worker. However, application of the
inference to even the short-term situation warrants skepticism, especially
when the workplace climate appears racially toxic. For example, a federal
court in Indiana recently applied the same-actor inference in a matter
involving racial epithets uttered by plaintiff's co-workers and participation
by plaintiff's team leader in telling racial jokes on the job.2 52 Despite this
evidence suggestive of a hostile environment, the court in Jean-Baptiste v.
K-Z, Inc. applied the inference, in part, apparently because plaintiff was
fired within twenty-one days of being hired.253 In this case, the court's
perfunctory application of the principle exemplifies its potential for
covering up a racially venomous workplace. The court stated, "that [the
decision-maker] fired the first black person he hired [was] clearly
insufficient to overcome this presumption and establish animus because
[this manager] 'could have refused to hire [plaintiff] in the first place.' 254
In this case, the court should have engaged in more critical examination of
the context of plaintiff's circumstances precisely because of the biased
comments in a work setting where plaintiff was the first African American
hired. Instead, the court portrayed the employer as inclusive and unbiased
simply because it knew the plaintiff was black when it hired him-in this
instance, pretending that the decision-maker is incapable of discriminatory
animus because he hired the plaintiff less than a month before is
wrongheaded. Jean-Baptiste is a stark example of the complexities of
251 See Sturm, supra note 10, at 669-72 (arguing there is a disconnect between law and the
"embedded patterns of relationships" in organizations).
252 Jean-Baptiste v. K-Z, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 652,656-57, 665 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
253 Id. at 656.
254 Id. at 666 (quoting EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th
Cir. 1996)). The court ultimately denied the employer's motion for summary judgment under a pure
circumstantial evidence framework. Yet, it spent considerable time assessing whether racial epithets,
slurs and jokes constituted a convincing "mosaic" of evidence directly pointing to discriminatory
animus to overcome the "strong" same-actor presumption. Jean-Baptiste, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 663-66.
In deciding that the plaintiff's evidence of racial bias failed to constitute a convincing mosaic, (despite
deposition testimony by plaintiff's group leader that he frequently told racial and national origin jokes),
the court discounted much of the evidence of racial hostility due to the existence of multiple decision-
makers and the same-actor doctrine.
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workplace bias in relational and cultural terms.255 As explored in Part II,
workplace environments are complex schema wherein bias remains
dormant until activated or concealed altogether. An employer should not
receive credit for its decision to hire a worker, particularly in a workplace
where diversity is non-existent at the outset.
Just because an employer decides to hire, promote, or otherwise
associate with a diverse candidate does not preclude discriminatory animus
from infecting the work relationship even in the short-term case. Granting
same-actor evidence "strong presumptive value" under such circumstances
exposes the illegitimacy of the principle's underlying assumption.
Labeling the principle a rebuttable presumption is disingenuous in light of
the hurdles a plaintiff experiences in overcoming such evidence. As
numerous other scholars in the workplace arena have asserted, a search for
motive without attention to the human and organizational influences is
likely to remain unproductive.256 Proud and its progeny simply focus on a
largely inconsequential aspect in light of workplace complexities. Thus,
same-actor evidence is of no real value. That a manager relays, "I was
there at the beginning and end," (or even beginning to end) should be of no
real consequence simply due to that consistency alone. Rather than
inquiring about who played a role, the courts should determine under what
circumstances the player(s) acted.
By promoting an historical reference in the tenure of a worker, courts
oblige employers in the application of the proof structure in disparate
treatment cases. In an increasingly competitive business world as
employers seek to increase productivity while minimizing costs, however,
it is inappropriate for courts to afford employers a kind of bias-free stamp
of approval based on a past favorable decision. For this to work, the courts
must attribute a great deal to the employer's initial decision and the
credibility of the decision-maker(s), and ignore the vectors that make
discrimination possible in any work setting. In this regard, the court yields
to the imagination of an equally just society in which we revel in a feel-
good story about how manner presupposes motive. 7 Why does the court
255 This matter involved racial epithets and jokes, some of which were uttered by co-workers, and
the group decision-making process, where only one of those decision-makers had participated in telling
racial jokes in the workplace. The court stated that "because [plaintiff's] termination was effectuated
by multiple decision-makers, [he] [could] not rely on evidence of just one decision maker's animus
alone." Id. at 665. Similarly, the court was not persuaded by the co-workers' hostile conduct because
they "played no role in making or influencing the decision to fire him." Id.
256 See McGinley, supra note 9, at 418-19 ("'[D]iscrininatory intent' represents an outdated view
of human behavior .... 2); Sturm, supra note 10, at 642 ("[A]nalysis based solely on motivation
ignores the role of cognition in shaping and producing bias."); Wade, supra note 172, at 1468 (arguing
that "[a]s long as corporate racial hierarchies persist, and as long as boards and managers ignore them,
societal racism will be entrenched").
257 Other scholars have recognized the judiciary's ability to discount the very existence of
workplace discrimination. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 9, at 1247-48 (suggesting that Title VII's
disparate treatment theory has "labored to long under a rhetoric of invidiousness that has outlived its
social utility"); McGinley, supra note 9, at 471 (theorizing that a counter-revolution in employment
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so want to believe in the altruism of the employer? The underlying
psychological assumption of Proud encompassed the view that the
principle benefited notions of diversity and inclusiveness.258 That assertion
constitutes a contradiction, however, that not only cheapens notions of
inclusion, but legitimizes window dressing by employers. The same-actor
doctrine operates as a subsidy of the cost of employers' efforts to diversify
their workplaces. In fact, under-informed analysis frustrates not only
diversity, but genuine inclusion and acceptance in the American
workplace.
Same-actor evidence and the significance courts accord it establish a
guideline for good organizational behavior. Such evidence inaccurately
signals to the fact finder that the employer values difference. As explored
in this Article, that may not be further from the truth. Moreover, business
operations are fluid bodies that react to market pressures and profit goals.
Thus, change is inevitable, and it is precisely this workplace evolution that
can manifest discriminatory animus. Accordingly, the doctrine has no
place in employment discrimination jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
Workplace discrimination is difficult to uncover. In 1991, Proud
further impeded plaintiffs' quest when it proclaimed that the nature of the
hirer-firer relationship bears significantly on the ultimate question of
discrimination where the same person engages in favorable action toward
the plaintiff. The same-actor doctrine pervades workplace law, but it
offers far less with respect to human motivation than its rapid evolution
would indicate. Importantly, in relying on the benign fact of consistency in
those involved in a decision-making process, the courts have reified a myth
about organizational structure and how humans behave in workplace
settings. Shifts in the power dynamics, organizational structures and
cultures complicate workplace decision-making, and that interplay has
been far too removed from the courts' application of the doctrine.
In this Article, I endeavored to demonstrate that the notion of one
employment decision serving as a proxy for another is misguided in our
contemporary workplace. 9  Interdisciplinary sources, including
management theory, organizational behavior, and cognitive psychological
discrimination law exists whereby courts develop various doctrines, such as the lack of interest defense,
because "judges do not believe discrimination is prevalent in today's workplace").
258 Proud, 945 F.2d at 798.
259 Interestingly, Professor Onwauchi-Willig recently has commented on the weight given by
courts to the use of black-on-black testimony by employers. Perceptively, she inquires "why one
minority's view that he has not experienced discrimination in the workplace is relevant to another
minority's individual disparate treatment claim. Instead, the question, I ask, or rather the claim I make,
is that factfmders also should consider how identity performance-in particular the immense pressures
that Blacks have in our society to perform their identities in ways that are racially palatable-may be
motivating the contradicting black witnesses's testimony." Onwauchi-Willig, supra note 201, at 1928.
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literature, all lend sophisticated insight by which to evaluate the
shortcomings of this doctrine. My exploration reveals that the same-actor
principle is anchored in an outdated narrative of the American workplace
and an inaccurate view of human motivation. Bias may only occur with
the passage of time during the employment relationship and often arises
from the very corporate structures and practices employers use to empower
workers. The courts' willingness to revert to a shortcut reflects a
misunderstanding and undervaluing of how organizations function in
contemporary society, and human motivation, more generally. This
contextualization was absent in the formulation and expansion of the
doctrine and remains largely absent in its continued widespread use.260
This doctrine derails the search for discriminatory animus considerably,
through fixation on the actors involved in the decision-making process. By
reducing intricacies of the modern workplace and the complex inquiry of
discrimination to a shorthand reference, the courts avoid thinking about
discrimination in any real sense, relying instead on an insufficient marker
of bias.
A more sophisticated understanding of people and organizations
should result in legal doctrines that enhance fairness and justice in the
workplace. By immunizing the employer against discrimination claims
based on its initial decision to hire or otherwise act favorably toward a
worker, the doctrine thwarts workplace equality, including the upward
mobility of workers and the promise that a pluralistic work environment
holds. Moreover, embedded in the misguided psychological assumption is
a counter-narrative, one that constructs persons of color, women and other
outsiders, not as victims of workplace discrimination, but as threats to
employer autonomy and workplace tranquility. A doctrine that insists on
casting employers as bias-free discounts the experiences of those
victimized and traumatized by the perniciousness of discrimination. The
same-actor doctrine is unwieldy and unreliable-simply unjust.
The bottom line is the same-actor doctrine is an overused legal
mechanism unmoored from the realities of the modem workplace. The
continued and unreflective application of it threatens workplace equality,
in large measure making businesses resistant to the antidote of Title VII.
This is a call for courts to cease playing in the dark and begin evaluating
disparate treatment in employment consistent with the realities of
contemporary work life.
260 See supra Part II.
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